The effects of extending intellectual property rights protection to developing countries: A case study of the Indian pharmaceutical market by Chaudhuri, Shubham et al.
 Columbia University 
 
Department of Economics 











The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property 
Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A  




















Department of Economics 
Columbia University 
New York, NY 10027 
November 2003 
 
The Eﬀects of Extending Intellectual Property
Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A












Under the TRIPS agreement, WTOmembers are required to enforce product patents
for pharmaceuticals. The debate about the merits of this requirement has been and con-
tinues to be extremely contentious. Many poor developing economies claim that patent
protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substantially higher prices for medicines,
with adverse consequences for the health and well-being of their citizens. On the other
hand, research-based global pharmaceutical companies, which claim to have lost billions
of dollars because of patent infringement, argue that prices are unlikely to rise signif-
icantly because most patented products have therapeutic substitutes. In this paper
we empirically investigate the basis of these claims. Central to the ongoing debate is
the structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in poor economies where, because health
insurance coverage is so rare, almost all medical expense are met out-of-pocket. Using
a product-level data set from India, which is unique in terms of its detail and coverage,
we estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and supply-side parameters for the
fluoroquinolones sub-segment of the systemic anti-bacterials (i.e., antibiotics) segment
of the Indian pharmaceuticals market. We then use these estimates to carry out coun-
terfactual simulations of what prices, profits (of both domestic firms and multinational
subsidiaries) and consumer welfare would have been, had the fluoroquinolone molecules
we study been under patent in India as they were in the U.S. at the time. Our results
suggest that concerns about the potential adverse welfare eﬀects of TRIPS may have
some basis. We estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory
licensing, the total annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal
of the four domestic product groups in the fluoroquinolone sub-segment would be on
the order of U.S. $713 million, or about 118% of the sales of the entire systemic anti-
bacterials segment in 2000. Of this amount, foregone profits of domestic producers
constitute roughly $50 million (or 7%). The overwhelming portion of the total welfare
loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare. In contrast, the profit gains to
foreign producers are estimated to be only around $57 million per year.
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1. Introduction
Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)–finalized
during the Uruguay round of multilateral trade negotiations, which culminated in the for-
mation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995–nations must, as a condition of
membership in the WTO, recognize and enforce product patents in all fields of technology,
including pharmaceuticals. At the time the TRIPS agreement went into eﬀect, many low
and middle income countries made an exception for pharmaceuticals, even if they recognized
product patents in other areas, because low-cost access to life-saving drugs and essential
medicines was deemed to be an overriding public policy priority.1 To meet their obligations
under TRIPS these countries must however introduce or amend their patent legislation to
include pharmaceutical product patents, with the transition- and least-developed economies
having until 2005 to do so.
The negotiations leading up to TRIPS, and in particular the provisions relating to phar-
maceuticals, were highly contentious. Though over 8 years have passed since TRIPS was
finalized, there continues to be considerable controversy and debate regarding its merits.2
The main point of contention is the claim made by governments of many poor developing
economies that unqualified patent protection for pharmaceuticals will result in substan-
tially higher prices for medicines, with adverse consequences for the health and well-being
of their citizens. Countering this claim, research-based global pharmaceutical companies,
which have potentially lost billions of dollars because of patent infringement by Third World
firms that have reverse-engineered their products, argue that the introduction of product
patents is unlikely to significantly raise prices because most patented products have many
therapeutic substitutes. Moreover, they claim that the absence of patent protection has
served as a disincentive to engage in research on diseases that disproportionately aﬄict
the world’s poor, implying that patent protection for pharmaceuticals will actually benefit
less-developed economies by stimulating innovation and transfer of technology.3
Given the scope of TRIPS and the intensity of the accompanying debate, it is remarkable
how sparse the evidence is, on which these divergent claims are based. Apart from the
findings of a small number of studies that we describe in more detail below, little is known
about the extent to which pharmaceutical prices in less-developed economies might increase
with the introduction of product patents, and the magnitude of the associated welfare
1Even among OECD countries, pharmaceutical product patents are a relatively recent phenomenon. For
instance, pharmaceutical products were excluded from patent protection in Germany until 1968, Switzerland
until 1977, Italy until 1978, Spain, Portugal and Norway until 1992, and Finland until 1995. Moreover, in
countries with a longer history of pharmaceutical product patents, such as Canada, France and the U.K.,
compulsory licensing provisions are quite liberal (Scherer and Watal (2001)).
2For instance, at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar in November 2001, the details of
TRIPS were again the subject of much discussion (see Stevenson (2001)). Underlying the continued debate
is the fact that there remain critical unresolved questions about how various provisions of TRIPS ought to
be interpreted–the language in many of the articles is deliberately vague–and the flexibility that WTO
member nations ought to have in applying various policy options, for instance, compulsory licensing or price
controls, that are permitted under TRIPS (see Barton (2001), Scherer and Watal (2001)).
3Arguments have also been made that the problems of low-cost access have less to do with the high prices
associated with patents, and more with the weaknesses of public health infrastructure and delivery systems
(see for instance, Bale (2001)).
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losses.4
There have been several empirical studies on the impact of patents on prices and in-
novative activity in various sectors including pharmaceuticals, in the context of developed
economies. Aside from the fact that none of these studies estimate welfare eﬀects, the
conclusions from these studies are not directly pertinent to the TRIPS debate because the
structure of demand for pharmaceuticals in less-developed economies diﬀers from that in
developed economies in four critical respects.
The first is simply the fact that households are much poorer in less-developed economies
and hence, per-capita health expenditures are several orders of magnitude lower than in
developed economies. The second crucial diﬀerence is that health insurance coverage is
much rarer in less-developed economies. As a result, the bulk of a household’s medical
expenditures are met out-of-pocket. Third, the burden of disease in low-income countries
stems from somewhat diﬀerent causes than in developed economies, and in particular, there
are certain diseases that are almost exclusively suﬀered by Third World populations. And
fourth, as Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000) point out, because the conditions under which
drugs are stored, transported or administered are considerably diﬀerent in less-developed
economies, the relative value that consumers place on characteristics such as storability,
transportability or ease of administration are likely to be diﬀerent as well. Table 2, which
is derived from statistics reported in the World Health Report for 2002 (WHO (2002)),
provides examples of these diﬀerences.
Any assessment of the potential price and welfare eﬀects of TRIPS needs therefore to be
based on a better empirically-grounded understanding of the characteristics of demand and
the structure of markets for pharmaceuticals in poor developing economies. To what extent
are consumers willing to trade oﬀ lower prices for older, possibly less eﬀective therapies?
How does this vary across diﬀerent therapeutic segments? Are consumers willing to pay
a premium for the pedigree and brand reputation of products marketed by subsidiaries
of foreign multinationals? How competitive are pharmaceutical markets? The welfare of
consumers depends on the pricing strategies and decisions of pharmaceutical firms. But
these in turn derive from the firms’ assessment of the structure of market demand. If
consumers are unwilling to pay substantially more for newer patented drugs for which there
exist older, possibly slightly less eﬀective generic substitutes, the ability of patent-holders
to charge a premium will be limited.
As mentioned above, a number of studies have carefully considered these issues, and have
used explicit models of consumer and firm behavior to simulate the welfare losses implied by
patent protection.5 But these studies, while they provide some useful indicative figures, are
ultimately limited by the fact that the simulations that are used to evaluate the potential
impact of patents are in each instance based on assumptions about demand characteristics
and market structure, rather than on actual estimates of the relevant parameters.
This paper takes a first step towards filling this gap. We provide the first rigorously-
4Even less is known about the other central questions relevant to the TRIPS debate, namely the extent
to which pharmaceutical research and product development priorities are likely to shift as a result of TRIPS,
and how large the welfare benefits of any therapeutically innovative drugs that result from this shift are
likely to be. The only paper that has carefully addressed such questions is Lanjouw and Cockburn (2000).
5See for instance, Challu (1991), Fink (2000), Maskus and Konan (1994), Nogues (1993), Subramanian
(1995), and Wattal (2000).
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derived estimates of the possible impact of pharmaceutical product patents on prices and
welfare in a developing economy. Using detailed product-level data on monthly pharma-
ceutical prices and sales over a two year period from January 1999 to December 2000, we
estimate key price and expenditure elasticities and market structure parameters for the
fluoroquinolone (quinolone henceforth6) segment of systemic anti-bacterials in the Indian
pharmaceuticals market. We chose this segment because it contains several products that
were still under patent in the U.S. during our sample period. We then use these estimates to
carry out counterfactual simulations of what prices, profits (of both domestic firms and sub-
sidiaries of foreign multinationals) and consumer welfare would have been, had the quinolone
molecules we study been under patent in India as they were in the U.S. at the time.
India provides a natural setting for our analysis for a number of reasons. It is a leading
example of a low-income country that did not recognize pharmaceutical product patents
at the time the TRIPS agreement went into eﬀect.7 In fact, during the Uruguay round
of negotiations, India led the opposition to the TRIPS articles mandating pharmaceutical
product patents. And at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, India was the
leading co-sponsor of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, which called for
clarifying and reconfirming that the TRIPS agreement should be interpreted and imple-
mented in a manner that ensures the rights of WTO members to protect public health and
promote access to medicines.
In terms of the structure of demand, India is a prototypical example of a low-income
country with a large number of poor households who, because health insurance coverage
is non-existent, have to meet all medical expenses out-of-pocket. Moreover, the disease
profile of the Indian population mirrors that of many other low-income countries and is
considerably diﬀerent from that of most developed economies.
Lastly, the domestic Indian pharmaceutical industry, which as of 2002 was the largest
producer of generic drugs in the world in terms of volume, is typical of that in many
middle-income countries with large numbers of small and medium sized firms with significant
imitative capabilities producing and marketing drugs domestically that are under patent
elsewhere.
During the period covered by our data, several molecules in the quinolone family were
still under patent in the U.S., but products containing these molecules were being produced
and distributed in India by both a number of domestic firms and a number of local sub-
sidiaries of foreign multinationals. We aggregate these products into a number of mutually
exclusive product groups where, within each product group all products contain the same
quinolone molecule (e.g., ciprofloxacin or norfloxacin, etc.), and are produced by firms with
the same domestic or foreign status. We then estimate a two-level demand system em-
ploying the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) specification of Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980) in both levels. The higher level corresponds to the allocation of expenditures to
various sub-segments within the systemic anti-bacterials segment of the market. At the
lower level we estimate the parameters relevant for the allocation of expenditures within
6Technically, the term “fluoroquinolones” refers to the latest generation of quinolones. However, older
quinolones (e.g., nalidixic acid) have market shares close to zero.
7Only in 2002 did India finally amend its patent legislation in accordance with TRIPS. The Patents
(Amendment) Act of 2002, the provisions of which went into eﬀect in May 2003, recognizes pharmaceutical
product patents for a period of 20 years.
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the quinolone sub-segment to the various product groups within this sub-segment (e.g.,
foreign ciprofloxacin, domestic ciprofloxacin, domestic norfloxacin, etc.).
With these estimates in hand we turn to the counterfactuals. The basic counter-
factual scenarios we consider all involve the withdrawal of one or more of the domestic
quinolone product groups from the market. The idea here is that had U.S. patents for,
say, ciprofloxacin, been recognized in India, all domestic products containing ciprofloxacin
would have to be removed from the market. That would leave only the foreign ciprofloxacin
product group in the market. Using our estimates of the own, cross-price, and expendi-
ture elasticities of the various product groups, as well as the estimates of marginal costs of
production, we are able to simulate the prices and market shares that would obtain under
each of the scenarios. Moreover, using the expenditure function associated with the higher-
level AIDS specification we are able to calculate the welfare loss–measured in terms of the
compensating variation, i.e., the additional expenditure that the representative Indian con-
sumer would need to incur to maintain her utility level in the face of the domestic product
withdrawal(s) and the accompanying price and market share changes–under each of the
counterfactual scenarios.
Apart from the fact that our counterfactual simulations are based on estimated rather
than assumed parameter values, this paper builds upon the earlier studies in two substantive,
and (it turns out) empirically important, ways.
First, by accommodating the possibility that consumers may diﬀerentiate between do-
mestic and foreign products even when these products contain the same patentable molecule,
we allow for an additional channel through which the introduction of product patents and
the consequent withdrawal of domestic products may adversely aﬀect consumers; and that
is through the loss of product variety.8 In contrast, previous studies on developing countries
assume that consumers are indiﬀerent between foreign and domestic products that contain
the same molecule. What this implies is that any adverse welfare eﬀects are only realized
through increased prices. The diﬀerence is most evident if we consider a scenario under
which domestic products are forced to withdraw from the market because of the introduc-
tion of product patents, but strict price regulations maintain prices at pre-patent levels.
In our approach consumers would still experience a welfare loss, whereas in the framework
adopted in earlier studies, such a scenario would entail no loss of welfare.
Empirically, the component of the loss of consumer welfare attributable to the loss
of variety from the withdrawal of domestic products turns out to be significant. From a
policy perspective, this suggests a possible role for compulsory licensing in addition to or
in lieu of price regulation since the latter, by itself, will not alleviate the welfare loss due
to loss of variety. Alternatively, one could argue that the loss we attribute to the reduction
of product variety is a purely transitional phenomenon, due to the fact that the current
product portfolios and distribution networks of foreign producers are limited. We discuss
these views in detail in the results section.
A second, and perhaps even more important methodological diﬀerence between this
paper and earlier studies is that we allow for and flexibly estimate a range of cross-product-
group and cross-molecule substitution eﬀects. In contrast, cross-price eﬀects are ignored
in earlier studies. To see why cross-price eﬀects are likely to significantly alter estimated
8This is the exact analog of the gains from additional variety emphasized in the studies of the valuation
of new product introductions, for instance Hausman (1994), and Hausman and Leonard (2002).
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welfare eﬀects in this context, imagine a scenario where the introduction of patents leads
to monopoly pricing in the market for a particular patentable molecule. If the markets for
potential substitutes are imperfectly competitive, then the increase in price in the origi-
nal patentable market will lead to corresponding upward price adjustments in the related
markets as producers of substitute products reoptimize in the face of the increased demand
for their products. The magnitude of any upward adjustments will naturally vary with the
degree of competition in related markets, and with the strength of the cross-price eﬀects.
But as long as the cross-price eﬀects are positive, and related markets are not perfectly
competitive, the loss of consumer surplus because of monopoly pricing in one market will
be multiplied through the ripple eﬀects of upward price adjustments in related markets.
If this were just a theoretical possibility it would not be of much interest. However, these
multiplier eﬀects turn out to be substantial in our counterfactual scenarios. Most strikingly,
the estimated loss of consumer welfare from the simultaneous withdrawal of all four domestic
product groups–the scenario that most closely resembles what is likely to happen under
TRIPS–is more than three times the sum of the estimated losses from the four separate
scenarios in each of which only one of the domestic product groups is withdrawn. What
this very clearly indicates is that past studies that have estimated the aggregate eﬀects
of patent protection by adding up the losses, estimated separately in each of a number of
patentable markets, may have substantially underestimated the magnitude of the consumer
welfare losses from the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents.
In absolute terms, we estimate that in the absence of any price regulation or compulsory
licensing the total annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from the withdrawal of all
four domestic product groups in the quinolone sub-segment would be on the order of Rs. 32
billion, or about 118% of the sales of the entire systemic anti-bacterials segment in 2000. At
the then prevailing exchange rate this translates into a figure of U.S. $ 713 million. Of this
amount, foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly Rs. 2.3 billion or U.S.
$50 million (ca. 7%). The overwhelming portion of the total welfare loss therefore derives
from the loss of consumer welfare.9
Worth noting as well is that our estimates indicate that the total profit gains to foreign
producers would be only about Rs. 2.6 billion or approximately U.S. $57 million per year.
To put this number in perspective, sales of Cipro, the main patented ciprofloxacin product
of Bayer, were roughly U.S. $1.6 billion in 2000 (Hensley (2001)). We estimate that the
prices of foreign products would rise between 200% and 750%.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly re-
view, from a conceptual perspective, the various hypothesized costs and benefits of product
patents. We also briefly summarize the existing evidence on the impact of pharmaceutical
patents. The following section lays out the essential features of the Indian pharmaceuticals
market, provides more detail about the segments that we focus on in the empirical analysis,
and briefly describes the primary data we use.
Section 4 is the core methodological section of the paper. There we describe in detail the
analytic framework and the econometric strategy we use to estimate the relevant parameters
and construct the counterfactual scenarios. We discuss our results in the fifth section.
Section 6 concludes.
9Not surprisingly in light of the discussion above, our estimates of the consumer welfare losses are much
higher than those reported in earlier studies for the entire pharmaceuticals market.
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2. Conceptual preliminaries and the existing evidence
The basic economic theory regarding the impact of patent protection on product prices and
consumer welfare is simple. Patents, by providing monopoly power–i.e., exclusive rights
to produce and sell the patented good–to the patent-holder, enable the latter to raise
the price of the patented good above the level that would have prevailed in a competitive
market. That is the immediate (static) eﬀect of patents. On the other hand, a longer-term,
more dynamic perspective suggests that the promise of these monopoly profits is precisely
what is needed to spur research and innovation that will lead to the introduction of newer
and better products, which will over time displace the older patented products and raise
consumer welfare.10
Within a multi-country setting the trade-oﬀs are no longer so simple. From the per-
spective of any individual economy, the welfare consequences of patent protection depend
on whether the patent-holders are foreign or domestic firms, and on the extent to which
patent protection serves to stimulate appropriate research and innovation; this, in turn, will
depend on what other nations are doing, and on the importance of the economy in question
in influencing the priority areas of research.11 The pricing decisions of patent-holders may
also be altered. Specifically, foreign patent holders may have a variety of reasons–concerns
about a public backlash in their home markets or the possibility of parallel imports, etc.–to
engage in global reference pricing, i.e., set prices not to maximize profits in the particular
national market but to maximize profits worldwide. For many poor economies this may
mean prices that are higher than domestic monopoly prices, magnifying the static pricing
distortions that arise from patents.
Matters become even more complicated when one considers markets characterized by
diﬀerentiated products, such as pharmaceuticals. Even within narrowly specified therapeu-
tic segments, consumers often have a choice of several alternative drugs, of varying vintages
and levels of therapeutic eﬀectiveness, produced by companies with varying reputations for
quality. Even if producers enjoy de facto monopoly power in the sales of their own products,
the presence of other ‘similar’ though not identical products in the market can inhibit the
ability of individual producers to manifest this monopoly power through higher prices. An
empirical assessment of the likely impact of patent protection in such markets therefore
requires a much more detailed understanding of the structure of demand.
A large number of empirical studies have attempted to estimate the impact of prod-
uct patents on prices and/or consumer welfare. Some studies have exploited data from
10Of course, patents are not the only way of providing incentives for research and innovation. Direct
subsidies for research, prizes and tournaments, and patent buyouts are all alternative mechanisms for doing
so, many of which have been used historically. In fact, because of the static pricing distortions they bring
about, the costs of any attempts at reverse engineering they may induce, and the fact that they do not
provide suﬃcient incentives for research that may have substantial spillovers, patents may be a particularly
ineﬃcient way of encouraging discovery. For a discussion of the varying economic perspectives on patents,
see M. Kremer (1998), Mazzoleni, R. and R. R. Nelson, (1998a, 1998b), and B. Wright (1983). The fact that,
even with full patent protection, market-oriented R&D is unlikely to result in new treatments for certain
tropical diseases that are exclusively the burden of poor populations (with limited ability to pay), has led
to calls for increased public funding for such eﬀorts (see for instance, Sachs (2002) and Ganslandt et al.
(2001)).
11See Chin and Grossman (1990), Deardoﬀ (1992), Helpman (1993), Grossman and Lai (2003) and espe-
cially Diwan and Rodrik (1991) for detailed analyses along these lines.
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particular historical episodes, or cleverly formulated comparisons to identify the eﬀects of
patents and competition on prices. For instance, Caves et al. (1991) compare the wholesale
prices of branded drugs to those of generic substitutes, and find that the relative price of
generic substitutes decreased with the number of generic substitutes available for a particu-
lar branded drug. Lu and Comanor (1998) report that newly patented drugs that provided
significant therapeutic gains over existing substitutes were launched at considerably higher
relative prices than those that oﬀered more modest therapeutic gain.12 While these studies
are able to isolate the likely impact of patent enforcement on prices, they are limited by
the fact that they do not (and cannot) provide any sense of the magnitude of the welfare
loss that consumers are likely to suﬀer, since they are not grounded in any explicit model
of consumer behavior.
3. The setting and the data
Between April 1972, when the Indian Patents Act (1970) became eﬀective, and May 2003,
when the provisions of the Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002 went into eﬀect, India did
not recognize product patents for pharmaceuticals. The Indian Patents Act (1970), which
replaced the inherited British colonial law regarding intellectual property rights, specifically
excluded pharmaceutical product patents and only admitted process patents for a period
of seven years.
The two stated objectives of the 1970 act were: the development of an indigenous
pharmaceuticals industry; and the provision of low-cost access to medicines for Indian
consumers. Consistent with these objectives, and with the broader leftward tilt in policy,
a number of other measures were introduced–drug price controls, restrictions on capacity
expansion, limits on multinational equity shares, etc.–that in the years since have, on the
one hand, kept pharmaceutical prices low, and on the other encouraged the development of
the Indian pharmaceutical industry. Many of these regulations and restrictions have been
lifted or eased since the mid-1980s with marked acceleration in the pace of liberalization
during the 1990s.
Over the last twenty years the Indian pharmaceutical industry has grown rapidly (see
Figures 1 and 2) to the point where it is now the world’s largest producer of formulations
in terms of volume, and one of the world’s largest producers of bulk drugs.13 The structure
of the industry has also evolved. In 1970 the industry was dominated by multinational
subsidiaries; by 2001, Indian-owned firms were not just the leading players in the industry,
many had also become major exporters. Table 1 documents this shift.
Table 2, which we alluded to earlier, conveys the basic point that the characteristics of
demand for pharmaceuticals in India is likely to diﬀer considerably from those in developed
economies. Table 3 reinforces this point. The table shows the shares of overall retail sales of
the major therapeutic segments into which pharmaceutical products are typically classified,
12See also Frank, R.G. and D.S. Salkever (1997), Rozek, R.P. and R. Berkowitz (1998), and Wattal (1996)
for other examples.
13Bulk drugs are the therapeutically relevant active pharmaceutical ingredients that are combined with a
variety of inactive ingredients to make the formulations that are ultimately consumed by patients. Firms in
the pharmaceutical sector can be of one of three types: bulk drugs producers, pure formulators, or integrated
firms, which produce both bulk drugs and market formulations.
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for the world market (in 2001) and the Indian market (in 2000). Note that with a share
of 23%, the anti-infectives segment ranks second in India whereas in the world market, it
is fifth and has a share of only 9.0%. Once again, this highlights the fact that the diseases
that are most relevant in developing countries do not necessarily coincide with those that
are viewed as most pressing in the developed world.
With this in mind, we focus in this paper on one particular sub-segment of anti-
infectives, namely the quinolone sub-segment. Quinolones fall into the systemic anti-biotics
and anti-bacterials segment of the Indian pharmaceuticals market, which generates over
three-quarters of the revenues in the anti-infectives segment14. The systemic anti-bacterials
segment includes all of the original miracle drugs that first sparked the growth of the global
research-based pharmaceutical industry in the post-World War II period, as well as later
generations of molecules that have been introduced in the last four decades. Table 4 lists the
major families of molecules in the systemic anti-bacterials segment and outlines the spec-
trum of activity for each family. Table 5 provides details about the systemic anti-bacterials
segment of the Indian market.
Among systemic anti-bacterials, quinolones are the latest generation molecules available
in India. We focus our analysis on quinolones for several reasons. First, as the last column
of Table 4 indicates, quinolones are the drug of choice for a large number of bacterial
infections, some of which are also treated by alternative drugs. Hence, if there were one
product group for which we would expect to have many substitutes readily available, this
would be quinolones. Second, with a share of 20% in the sales of systemic anti-bacterials
(see Table 5), quinolones represent one of the largest sub-segments within this therapeutic
category. Finally, several molecules within the quinolone sub-segment were still under patent
in the U.S. at the time of our investigation. This is shown in Table 7 that details the basic
information about the four quinolone molecules that are the focus of our analysis. The first
row shows the year of U.S. patent expiry; this ranges from 1998 for norfloxacin, to 2010
for sparfloxacin. Quinolones include in principle four more molecules that are listed at the
bottom of Table 6; however, the market shares of these molecules are negligible, so that we
exclude these molecules from our analysis.
Table 7 reveals several other interesting facts about competition in the quinolone market
in India. First, note the large number of firms operating in this sub-segment. The large
number of domestic firms is perhaps not that surprising given that pharmaceutical product
patents were not recognized in India.15 What is more surprising is the number of foreign
firms selling patented products (e.g., ciprofloxacin); the fact, that multiple foreign firms
sell a patented product indicates that such firms often “infringe” patent laws in India,
while complying with them in developed world countries. The last two rows of Table 7
further indicate that domestic products often sell at a premium. With the exception of
ofloxacin, the average prices of products oﬀered by Indian firms are higher than the prices
of products oﬀered by foreign subsidiaries. This preliminary evidence suggests that Indian
consumers do not place a premium on the brand name and reputation of big multinational
pharmaceutical concerns. Moreover, the higher price of domestic products does not seem
14 In addition to anti-bacterials, this segment contains also anti-virals.
15Accordingly, the common distinction between “branded” and “generic” products is irrelevant here. The
large number of domestic firms is due to the fact that many Indian firms sell only in particular regions of
the country.
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to prevent domestic companies from capturing a large market share. This is most evident
in the case of ciprofloxacin, where domestic firms have, with 53%, the largest share in the
total sales of quinolones; and this, despite the fact that the average price of these products
is 10% higher than the price of foreign products containing the same molecule.
Our data are from the retail pharmaceutical audits of ORG-MARG, India’s premier mar-
ket research and consulting firm. The audit provides detailed product-level information–
estimates of monthly retail sales in each of the four geographic zones of India, price, dosage
form, launch date, brand name, chemical name, therapeutic categorization, etc.–on all
pharmaceutical products sold in India by about 300 of the largest firms, representing roughly
90% of domestic retail sales of pharmaceuticals. The coverage of the audit is extensive,
reaching a representative panel of thousands of retail chemists in over 350 cities and towns.
The data collected, which provide the only real source of disaggregate information on the
Indian pharmaceutical market, are used by both the government of India in formulating
pricing policy and other decisions, and the Indian pharmaceutical industry in determining
pricing and marketing strategies. We have data on monthly sales for the period of January
1999 to December 2000.
4. The analytic framework and estimation approach
4.1. Overview
Patent enforcement in the Indian pharmaceutical market will have the eﬀect of eliminat-
ing domestic products whose active pharmaceutical ingredients are protected by (foreign)
patents. Thus, assessing the eﬀects of patent enforcement is tantamount to assessing the
eﬀects of withdrawing domestic products from the market. This task is the converse of eval-
uating new product introduction; accordingly, the conceptual framework we use to address
the questions of interest is similar to the one developed in the literature for the valuation
of new goods.
In order to assess the eﬀects of product withdrawal we need to derive for each product
withdrawn its virtual price, that is the notional price that would set this product’s demand
equal to zero. Estimation of this virtual price requires estimation of the demand function.
Hence, the first step in the analysis is demand estimation. The demand parameters allow us
to estimate the price elasticities of demand and substitution patterns across products in the
antibiotics market, which are needed in the computation of virtual prices and subsequent
welfare analysis. Given the significance of the demand estimates in our analysis, it is
important to adopt a relatively general and flexible demand specification. We discuss the
available alternatives and our specification choices in detail in the next subsection.
While with perfect competition estimation of the demand function for a particular prod-
uct is suﬃcient for assessing the eﬀects of this product’s elimination from the market, im-
perfect competition requires modelling of the entire market, as removal of one product will
aﬀect the prices of other products, especially those that are close competitors. To evaluate
the eﬀects of a product’s withdrawal on other products’ prices, it is necessary to model the
supply side, that is firms’ costs and strategic behavior. While strategic interaction seems
a-priori important in the Indian pharmaceutical market, the market is also characterized
by price controls which impose potential constraints on firms’ maximization problem. We
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discuss these issues in the following subsection. We exploit the firms’ first order conditions
associated with the solution of the profit maximization problem and/or the existence of
price controls to estimate marginal costs and markups, and use those estimates in subse-
quent counterfactual simulations.
With demand and cost parameters in place, we are then ready to conduct counterfactual
simulations. We consider several alternative scenarios depending on the number of domestic
products that are aﬀected by patent enforcement. For each scenario, we first compute the
virtual prices of the products that are removed from the market. To do this, we set the
demand of these products equal to zero, while allowing firms that remain in the market
to reoptimize and set new prices in response to the exit of domestic products. Hence, we
derive the virtual prices of the products that are being withdrawn and the predicted prices
of the products remaining in the market in the same step. These counterfactual prices are
then used to assess the eﬀects of domestic product withdrawal on consumer welfare, firm
profits, and social welfare. While the computation of the profit changes is straightforward,
the calculation of the consumer welfare changes is more involved. To the extent that the
demand system is consistent with utility maximization, we can use the demand function to
derive the associated expenditure function, that is the minimum amount of income required
for the average (representative) consumer to achieve a particular utility level at given prices.
We then measure the welfare change associated with the elimination of domestic products
by the compensating variation, that is the additional expenditure that consumers need
in order to achieve the same utility level as before patent enforcement at the new prices.
Details of these computations and exact formulas are provided in sub-section describing
how we construct the counterfactuals.
4.2. Empirical specification of demand
Demand estimation on pharmaceuticals has traditionally faced two challenges. The first one
is that because many drugs in developed countries can be bought only with prescription,
and a substantial number of consumers are covered by insurance, agency (i.e., the relation-
ship between doctors and patients) and moral hazard issues (i.e., doctors may prescribe
more expensive products than they would in the absence of insurance) can have important
implications for the estimated demand patterns and their interpretation.16 Fortunately,
these issues do not arise in the Indian pharmaceutical market. As discussed earlier, in
India basically all private health expenses are met out-of-pocket because health insurance
coverage is so rare.
The second challenge is that the pharmaceutical market is a classic diﬀerentiated prod-
uct market. Even within narrowly specified therapeutic segments, consumers often have
a choice among products containing diﬀerent active pharmaceutical ingredients, of varying
vintages and levels of therapeutic eﬀectiveness, produced by companies with varying repu-
tations for quality17. Moreover, such products are available in multiple presentations, that
16Cleanthous(2003) for example reports a very low price elasticity of demand for the U.S. market of
antidepressants. Breaking down the results by insurance status, he finds that the low price elasticity of
demand is primarily driven by the price insensitivity of consumers who are insured. For such consumers,
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the price elasticity of demand is zero; in contrast, consumers without
insurance have significantly higher price elasticity of demand.
17Note that the familiar (from developed countries) distinction between branded and generic drugs is not
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is combinations of dosage forms (capsule, tablet, syrup, etc.), strength (100 milligrams, 500
milligrams, etc.), and packet sizes (50 capsule bottle, 100 tablet bottle, etc.). The various
presentations in which a product is available are often referred to as stock-keeping units
or SKUs.18 Even if we define products by aggregating across the multiple presentations,
in which drugs containing the same active pharmaceutical ingredient are marketed by a
particular manufacturer (in which case a product represents a unique combination of a
manufacturer and an active pharmaceutical ingredient (API)), the number of products in
the segment of interest is large. For instance, in 1991, there were, under our definition, 589
distinct products available in the systemic anti-biotics and anti-bacterials sub-segment of
the Indian market. By 2000, that number had risen to 1242.
The multiplicity of diﬀerentiated products poses problems for the standard techniques
of demand estimation. Over the last ten years, however, new strategies and techniques have
been proposed for the estimation of demand parameters in diﬀerentiated products markets.
Among them, the two approaches that have been used most frequently in empirical work
are the discrete-choice framework (e.g., Trajtenberg (1989), Goldberg (1995), Berry et al.
(1995), Nevo (2001), etc.) and the multi-stage budgeting approach (Ellison et al (1997),
Hausman (1994), Hausman and Leonard (2002), etc.).
In the case of pharmaceuticals, the discrete-choice approach presents some diﬃculties,
both conceptual and practical. At a conceptual level, the basic assumption of unit demand
by individual consumers that underlies the discrete choice framework seems untenable.
Moreover, it is well known that computationally tractable versions of discrete choice models
tend to overstate the welfare eﬀects of product entry or exit, since the implied demand
functions never intersect the vertical axis, that is, product demand can never become zero
(in other words, the implied virtual prices are infinity). This feature arises because the
presence of an idiosyncratic error term in the underlying utility function implies a taste
for variety; accordingly, each additional product generates an increment in utility, and the
product space can never become too crowded19. In practice, the consequences of this aspect
of discrete choice models for welfare analysis can be mitigated through the adoption of
relatively general functional forms (e.g., random coeﬃcient models) and/or the use of micro
data. Unfortunately, we do not have micro data in the present application. Furthermore,
the type of counterfactuals we are interested in makes us particularly cautious not to adopt
an approach that would–by its nature–tend to overstate the welfare eﬀects of product
entry and exit. In particular, while welfare analysis has typically been applied to evaluate
the introduction of a single product, in the present case we are interested in evaluating
the eﬀects of simultaneously withdrawing multiple domestic products from the market–
potentially the whole domestic segment. Even if a flexible random coeﬃcient model only
slightly overstated the welfare eﬀects of a single product’s withdrawal, the cumulative eﬀect
of such overstatement when multiple products are withdrawn from the market could be
meaningful in a market with no patent protection.
18For instance, a 100 capsule bottle of 100 milligram capsules of a particular branded drug, and a 50
capsule bottle of 100 milligram capsules of the same branded drug would be identified as two separate
SKUs.
19For a discussion see, for example, Berry and Pakes (2001). The other extreme, a model without the
idiosyncratic error term (the pure hedonic model discussed in Berry and Pakes (2001)), would also be
unappealing in the current context, as the therepeutic eﬀectiveness of a drug is not completely captured by
its observed characteristics but varies by consumer.
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significant.
In practical terms, the discrete choice approach requires data on physical sales shares
(as opposed to revenue shares). If the analysis were limited to sales of pharmaceutical
products containing a single molecule (i.e., active pharmaceutical ingredient), this would
not pose a problem as we have data on the quantity of the relevant API (e.g., 100 milligrams
of ibuprofen) contained in each of the products in our database. But if the analysis were
to be extended to include products containing other molecules that represent close ther-
apeutic substitutes, it is not clear that physical sales shares are terribly meaningful. For
instance, 100 milligrams of ciprofloxacin are not directly comparable with 100 milligrams
of norfloxacin.
For all these reasons, we base our estimation strategy on a multi-stage budgeting ap-
proach. The basic idea of this approach is to use the therapeutic classification of a product–
i.e., the therapeutic segment and sub-segment the product belongs to–to organize all prod-
ucts in the systemic anti-bacterials segment into a hierarchical taxonomy, consisting of two
levels. At the higher level are the various sub-segments of systemic anti-bacterials, listed
in Table 5. The first stage of budgeting then corresponds to the allocation of expenditures
across the sub-segments in this upper level of the taxonomy.
In the second stage of the budgeting process, corresponding to the lower level of the
taxonomy, a flexible functional form is adopted to model how the expenditures allocated to
each sub-segment are distributed across the products within that sub-segment. In particular,
to model demand at the second stage we employ the “Almost Ideal Demand System” (AIDS)
specification proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
The two-stage demand estimation approach we propose presents many advantages.
Functional form flexibility is one of them. While the a-priori segmentation of the product
space at the higher level imposes some restrictions on the demand patterns, the substitution
patterns implied by the AIDS specification at the lower level are very general, as they permit
(in principle) an unconstrained pattern of conditional cross-price elasticities across products
within a sub-segment. Given that competition among diﬀerentiated products tends to be
highest within sub-segments, this lack of restrictions at the lower stage is a considerable
advantage of AIDS over alternative approaches. An additional advantage is that the AIDS
model, though developed with micro data in mind, aggregates perfectly over consumers
without requiring linear Engel curves. This is important here, since we work with aggregate
data. Finally, the implied demand curves intersect the price axis, so that the virtual price
is not infinity.
However, the application of the two-level demand estimation to the Indian systemic
antibiotics market also poses a couple of problems. The first one is that due to entry and
exit, many SKUs and even products in our sample are not present in every period. AIDS
does not have a good way of dealing with a varying number of products, as it was developed
with broad commodity categories in mind, which are consumed by all consumers every
period. To solve this problem, within each sub-segment (e.g., quinolones), we aggregate
SKUs into product groups where within each product group, all SKUs contain the same
molecule and are produced by firms with the same domestic/foreign status. Specifically, let
a SKU k be indexed by its molecule (or API)M , its domestic/foreign status DF indicating
whether it is produced by a domestic (Indian) or a subsidiary of a foreign (multinational)
firm, a particular presentation s, and the particular firm f that produces it. We aggregate
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SKUs over presentations and firms to obtain a newly defined product group i, which is only
indexed by molecule M and domestic/foreign status DF , and has revenue Ri = Σf,sRk,
with i ∈ (M,DF ), k ∈ (M,DF, f, s), and price pi = Σf,sωkpk, where ωk denotes the





In most cases, the resulting product groups are broad enough to be present every period.
The usual concern with this aggregation procedure is that it may lead us to overstate
firms’ market power, as we ignore competition among firms with the same domestic/foreign
status, producing the same molecule. However, in the present application this concern is
unlikely to be of great importance, as the eﬀect of patent enforcement is to wipe out all
domestic competition at once, while granting foreign firms monopoly power; hence, compe-
tition among firms for patented molecules becomes irrelevant. The aggregation according
to the domestic/foreign status (within a particular molecule) thus corresponds to the scope
of our analysis and the particular questions of interest.
The second problem is that for our approach to be useful in welfare analysis, the allo-
cation of total expenditures to group expenditures at the higher stage has to be modelled
in a way consistent with utility maximization. In general, the solution of this allocation
problem requires knowledge of all individual product prices. From an empirical point of
view this is not particularly useful, as it eliminates all computational advantages of the
two-stage approach. Ideally, we would like to use a single price and quantity index for each
product group when modelling the allocation of total expenditure to groups. The necessary
and suﬃcient conditions for this practice to be consistent with utility maximization were
derived by Gorman and turn out to be so restrictive that they are empirically implausible
(e.g., additive separability and a group indirect utility function of the Gorman Generalized
Polar Form). More flexible functional forms (such as a double-log specification for mod-
elling the higher level expenditure allocation) violate the conditions for exact two-stage
budgeting. Given these diﬃculties we adopt an approximate solution to model the higher
level expenditure allocation along the lines suggested by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b,
pp. 131-132). This gives rise to a two-level AIDS specification that we describe in detail
below.
Consider the lower level estimation first, which refers to the allocation of a particular
sub-segment’s expenditure to the product groups within the sub-segment. In our application
the relevant sub-segment is quinolones, which we index with Q. Let the product groups
within this sub-segment be indexed by i = 1, ...N , pi be the price of product group i (where,
as noted above, i refers to a particular molecule and domestic/foreign status combination),
uQ be the utility consumers derive from quinolones, and XQ the total expenditure on
the quinolone segment. The AIDS model is based on the following specification of the
expenditure function for quinolones eQ:
ln eQ(uQ, p) = a(p) + uQb(p) (4.2)
where:
a(p) = α0 +Σiαi ln pi +
1
2






This specification of the expenditure function yields an expression for the revenue share of
each product group, which provides the basis for estimation:










, with i, j ∈ Q (4.6)
XQ is the overall expenditure on the quinolone sub-segment, and PQ is a price index given
by:
lnPQ = a(p) = α0 +Σiαi ln pi +
1
2
ΣiΣjeγij lnpi ln pj (4.7)
The AIDS model was originally developed with micro data in mind, so thatXQ and ωi in
the equations above refer to a household’s expenditure and expenditure shares respectively.
However, Muellbauer (1975, 1976) and Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) show that exact
aggregation over households is possible so that equation (4.5) above can be applied in nearly
identical form to aggregate data, with ωi denoting the aggregate conditional expenditure
share of product group i, and XQ denoting the average expenditure of a representative
household.20 Thus interpreted, equation (4.5) can be estimated with aggregate product-level
data on revenue shares, prices, and average household expenditure. Note that if equation
(4.5) did not involve the exact price index PQ, it would be linear in the parameters to be
estimated. To avoid non-linearities, PQ can be approximated by the Stone price index PQS
(logPQ,S = Σkωk log pk) along the lines discussed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a).
The AIDS model in this, its most general form, is extremely flexible, imposing few
implicit restrictions on patterns of substitution across product groups. For instance, the
constant-expenditure cross price elasticity of any product group i with respect to the price














20Specifically, the aggregate version of equation (4.5) becomes:
ωi = αi + Σjeγij ln pj + βi ln( XQkPQ )
where ωi denotes the share of aggregate expenditure on product i in the aggregate budget of all households,
and XQ is the average level of quinolone expenditure. The index k reflects the demographic structure and
distribution of budgets across households. Ideally, one would try to model k using data on the distribution
of household budgets and characteristics. In the absence of such information this approach is infeasible.
However, given that our data span only a short time period (two years), it is reasonable to assume that the
distribution of household budgets and characteristics is invariant, in which case k is a constant. In this case
one can redefine α∗i = αi − βi log k, and apply this modified version of equation (4.5) to aggregate data.
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=eγij + βi[ωj − βj ln(XQPQ )]
ωi

The flexibility of the AIDS model thus derives from the fact that it includes N2 para-
meters that directly influence the patterns of substitution. They are the elements of the
matrix:
Γ =
 eγ11 ...eγ1i... eγ1Neγi1 ...eγii... eγiNeγN,1 ...eγNi... eγNN
 (4.9)
With a limited number of product groups and a suﬃciently large number of time-series
observations, the flexibility implied by the AIDS model does not impose too many demands
on the data. However, in the present application where the number of observations is
limited, the AIDS model is not estimable in this general form. To reduce the number of
parameters that need to be estimated, we impose two sets of restrictions directly on the
elements of the matrix Γ.
The first set of restrictions are implied by the theory of utility maximization. We impose
these restrictions despite the fact that they have been routinely rejected in applications of
the AIDS model to broader product categories, for two reasons. First, as noted above,
we need to restrict the number of parameters, and imposing the restrictions implied by
economic theory provides a natural way to do so. Second, given that we are interested
in conducting welfare analysis, it is important that our framework satisfies the restrictions
implied by utility maximization. Specifically, these restrictions are:
• Adding-up: Σkαk = 1; Σkβk = 0; Σkeγkj = 0, ∀j.
• Homogeneity: Σkeγjk = 0, ∀j.
• Symmetry: γij = 12 [eγij + eγji] = γji. This last restriction by itself reduces the number
of γ parameters to N(N+1)2 .
The second set of restrictions we impose aims at further reducing the number of γ para-
meters to be estimated by exploiting our knowledge of this particular market. Specifically,
for each product group i, we allow one γij parameter for all product groups j that have
diﬀerent molecules from product group i and are produced by foreign firms, and one γij for
product groups j with diﬀerent molecules produced by domestic firms. We don’t impose any
restrictions on the γij parameter when product group j has the same molecule as product
group i. (By construction, product groups i and j contain products produced by firms with
diﬀerent nationality.)
To better illustrate the nature of the restrictions we impose on the patterns of substitu-
tion across products, some additional notation is needed. Let d(i, j) be an indicator of the
degree of similarity (or diﬀerence) between product group i and product group j, along the
dimensions we are able to observe (molecule M and domestic/foreign status DF ). For any
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two product groups, i and j, d(i, j) can take on one of the following three values:21
d(i, j) =

(1, 0) if Mi =Mj ,DFi 6= DFj
(0, 1) if Mi 6=Mj ,DFi = DFj
(0, 0) if Mi 6=Mj ,DFi 6= DFj
(4.10)
Let
Dabi = {j : d(i, j) = (a, b)} (4.11)
the final form of the equation we estimate at the lower level becomes (with subscript t
denoting month):
ωit = αi + γii ln pit +Σj∈D10i [γi,10 ln pjt] +Σj∈D01i [γi,01 ln pjt] (4.12)





• the parameter γii captures a product group’s own price eﬀect (note that there will be
as many γii parameters as number of product groups).
• the parameter γi,10 captures the cross-price eﬀects across product groups containing
products with the same molecule but produced by firms of diﬀerent nationality.
• the parameter γi,01 captures the cross-price eﬀects of product groups containing prod-
ucts with diﬀerent molecules but produced by firms with the same nationality.
• the parameter γi,00 captures the cross-price eﬀects of product groups containing prod-
ucts with diﬀerent molecules produced by firms of diﬀerent nationality.
The analysis so far has conditioned on the expenditure allocated to the quinolone sub-
segment XQ. The upper level of the estimation considers the problem of allocating to-
tal expenditure across the diﬀerent systemic anti-biotics sub-segments, one of which is
quinolones.22 This problem is more involved than the lower level budgeting problem con-
sidered above. To see why, let u be the direct utility consumers derive from consuming
commodity vector q. Assuming weak separability, the utility function can be written as
u = v(q) = f [v1(q1), ...vQ(qQ), ...vG(qG)] = f(u1,...uQ, ...uG) (4.13)
where v1, v2, ...vG are well-behaved subutility functions of the non-overlapping product vec-
tors q1, q2, ...qG. The subscripts here refer to “groups” or “sub-segments” within the sys-
temic anti-biotics market. A utility function of this form gives rise to second-stage demand
functions of all products within segment G of the form qi = gi(xG, pG), where xG is the
expenditure on group G, and pG is the vector of within-group prices. The demand functions
21The sequence (1, 1) is not possible for two diﬀerent products; in this case the γ parameter corresponds
to the product’s own price eﬀect, that is γii.
22This formulation of the problem conditions on the total expenditure allocated to the market of systemic
antibiotics.While the allocation of total income to systemic antibiotics could potentially be modelled by
introducing a third stage in the demand estimation, we abstract from this problem in this paper.
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represented by (4.5) or (4.12) above fall into this category. Utility function (4.13) is to be
maximized subject to the budget constraint
ΣGeG(uG, pG) = X (4.14)
where eG(uG, pG) is the group expenditure function which minimizes the expenditure of
reaching group utility level uG given the within-group price vector pG, that is eG(uG, pG) =
minqG [Σk∈Gpkqk; vG(qG) = uG]. It is easy to see that in general this maximization prob-
lem requires knowledge of all individual prices within each group, unless one imposes the
restrictive conditions discussed at the beginning of this section. The approximate solu-
tion proposed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) relies on first rewriting the expenditure
function of each group G as follows:






where p0G is a base period price vector. The second term on the right hand side is the true
cost-of-living price index for group G. This can be written as PG(pG, p0G, uG) to emphasize
the dependence of the exact price index on the utility level uG. The first term of the
right hand side can be interpreted as the money cost of reaching utility level uG with the
base period price vector p0G. Accordingly, this term can be interpreted as a quantity index
denoted by QG. The utility maximization problem can now be reformulated as maximizing
the indirect utility function corresponding to (4.13) subject to the budget constraint
ΣGPG(pG, p
0
G, uG)QG = X (4.16)
This is the standard form, with matching price and quantity indices, PG andQG respectively.
Still, the diﬃculty remains that the exact price index PG is a function of the utility level
uG, so that in principle we are where we started. However, Deaton and Muellbauer observe
that if the empirical variation of PG with uG is not too great, then the exact price index
can be approximated by commonly used price indices. This approximation allows one to
solve the maximization problem to obtain first stage demand functions of the form:
QG = gG(P1, ...PG,X) (4.17)
where PG is a commonly used price index, and QG is a quantity index. This specifica-
tion gives rise to an approximate two-stage budgeting system that is easy to implement
empirically.
In particular, we employ Deaton and Muellbauer’s approximation to justify a higher
level AIDS system that has the following form:
Expenditure function: lnE(u, P ) = A(P ) + uB(P ) (4.18)




where all variables denoted by capital letters are defined as before, but now refer to sub-
segments (G,H, ...) rather than individual products within a sub-segment, and the total
expenditures on systemic anti-biotics X are deflated by the Stone price index logP =
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ΣHωH logPH . When estimating the above system we impose all the restrictions implied by
utility maximization, as we do with the estimation of the lower level AIDS. However, we
do not impose any additional restrictions on the substitution patterns at this stage, so that
the cross-price eﬀects across segments remain relatively unconstrained.
Estimation of the higher level AIDS allows us to obtain the unconditional own- and
cross-price elasticities that are used in the formulation of the supply problem and welfare
analysis. These will be given by the formula:








In sum, the demand system we take to the data is represented by equations (4.12) and
(4.19) and the associated parameter restrictions implied by economic theory.
4.3. Modelling the supply side of the market
Counterfactual simulations concerning the eﬀects of domestic product withdrawal require
knowledge of the marginal costs of pharmaceutical firms operating in the Indian market.
In the absence of cost data, we follow the usual approach in the New Empirical Industrial
Organization literature of exploiting the firm equilibrium conditions to infer marginal costs.
We assume constant marginal costs ci, and model the industry as an oligopoly engaging
in Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated products. The usual procedure is then to as-
sume that firms myopically maximize profits each period, and derive the firms’ first order
conditions under the above assumptions about market structure and firm behavior.
We deviate from this procedure for two reasons. First, simple inspection of our price
data suggests that the assumption of period-by-period maximization is implausible; prices
are remarkably stable at a disaggregate level (SKU or presentation level), indicating that
firms do not adjust them every period (see also the related discussion in the next subsection
under identification). It seems more likely that firms set prices only periodically, in response
to entry or exit, or other major changes in market conditions, and then keep them fixed until
the next big shock. The second reason for not relying on period-by-period maximization
to obtain the marginal costs is that many products are subject to price controls and other
regulations. Price controls are imposed at the molecule (API) level. For products subject
to price controls, prices are roughly equal to the production cost (based on the cost of the
API) plus a predetermined markup. Given this, we employ the following approach.
Let the superscripts c and u denote products that are constrained (by price controls),
and products that are unconstrained respectively. For constrained products we model their






where pci denotes the average price of the product, c
c
i is the average (over the sample
period) marginal cost, and mci is the allowed markup, which usually varies between 10%
and 15%. Equation (4.21) provides a straightforward way for obtaining the marginal costs
of constrained products.
For unconstrained products, we assume that the first order conditions of profit maxi-








with pui and c
u
i denoting the average (over the sample period) price and cost of the uncon-
strained product respectively, and εii(pui ,pj)
the own- price elasticity of demand for product
i, evaluated at the sample mean of the product’s own price pui , and the sample means of all
other products’ prices pj, with i 6= j.23
Once we have obtained the demand elasticities through estimation of the demand system,
we can calculate marginal costs according to (4.21) or (4.22) depending on whether the
product falls into the constrained category or not. The final issue to resolve is which
products are “constrained”, and which are not. For products with molecules that are not
subject to price controls, obviously (4.22) applies. However, for products with molecules
under price controls, we need a criterion for deciding whether these controls were binding
over our sample period or not. Unfortunately, price controls exhibit virtually no time
variation over our sample period, so that formal identification of their eﬀects is impossible.
However, in many cases the price data themselves are revealing. Specifically, if there is
a product that has the same molecule as another product, but consistently exhibits lower
price, it seems safe to infer that the price controls on the lower-price product are not binding
(this is for example the case with foreign norfloxacin, whose price is consistently lower than
the price of domestic norfloxacin) . In ambiguous cases, we experiment with both approaches
of employing (4.21) and (4.22) to infer marginal costs.
4.4. Identification assumptions and estimation approach
The discussion of the demand system has so far treated prices as exogenous. In fact,
economic endogeneity of prices is unlikely to be an issue, as the discussion of the previous
subsection suggests. The usual premise in the recent Industrial Organization literature
is that correlation of prices with the error term in the demand equation arises by virtue
of the first order conditions of profit-maximizing firms. However, the existence of price
controls and other institutional regulations in the Indian pharmaceutical market, and the
relative stability that disaggregate prices (at the SKU level) exhibit empirically over time,
make the premise that the first order conditions hold each period implausible. Instead, the
assumption that prices (at the SKU level) are predetermined in each period seems more
appropriate in the present context.
However, a more serious concern is the econometric endogeneity of prices that arises
because of measurement error induced by our aggregation procedure. Remember that in
order to obtain the prices of each product category that appear on the right hand side of
the revenue share equation, we aggregate at the extremely disaggregate SKU (presentation)
level, using the current revenue shares of the corresponding SKU’s as weights. It is clear
23Note that given that product category i here refers to a molecule/domestic-foreign combination, this
procedure will tend to understate marginal costs, and overstate markups, as we ignore the competition
within each product category. However, this approach should not aﬀect the welfare analysis in a substantial
manner, since we condition on the obtained marginal costs when we conduct counterfactual analysis. This
is of course not an issue when we use equation (4.21) to obtain marginal costs, as the competition within
the product category is in this case irrelevant for price setting.
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that this procedure can induce correlation between prices and the error term of the demand
equation. Suppose, for example, that due to a special promotion the demand for a drug’s
relatively more expensive presentation increases in some period, while all prices, and the
demand of all other presentations for this product remain fixed. Our aggregation approach
would imply both a higher demand and a higher price for that product in this period (since
the weight of the expensive presentation would increase). Hence, in this case we would
erroneously infer that demand is positively related to prices, though in reality this result is
simply an artifact of our aggregation procedure.
To address this simultaneity bias we employ instrumental variables. As usual, valid
instruments are variables that are correlated with product prices, but are orthogonal to the
error terms of the demand equations at the product-group level. Prices at the SKU level
are obvious candidates, as they are clearly correlated with product prices (product prices
are indeed revenue-weighted averages of SKU prices), but do not aﬀect the demand of the
product directly.24 In addition, to account for the fact that firms may reset prices period-
ically in response to changing market conditions, such as the number of competitors, we
include in our instruments variables that proxy for the intensity of competition. After some
experimentation, our final list of instruments includes the prices of the five largest SKU’s
for each group, and the Herfindahl index for each group. Regressions of group prices on the
above instruments yield high R-squares, with most regressors highly significant, indicating
that our instruments are highly correlated with prices. We have also experimented with
using the number of presentations in each group in various combinations with SKU prices
as instruments. The demand parameters are fairly stable across these experiments.
Our sample includes four molecules: ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, ofloxacin and sparfloxacin.
Except for sparfloxacin, all other molecules are produced by both foreign and domestic firms.
So we have seven products (domestic ciprofloxacin, foreign ciprofloxacin, etc.), with 96 ob-
servations (two years of monthly data, four geographical regions for each period) for each
product. The parameters in the lower level AIDS demand system as defined in equation
(4.12) are: the constants αi, the own revenue-share price elasticities γii, the cross revenue-
share price elasticities γi,10, γi,01, γi,00 and the revenue-share expenditure elasticities βi. In
estimating the parameters, we first regress prices on all instrumental variables, and then
plug the predicted values for prices in the constrained least-square regression (for a detailed
explanation of the constraints see the previous section).
Given that we impose many cross-equation constraints and employ instrumental vari-
24The implicit assumption here is that entry and exit of SKU’s into the sample aﬀect product demand
only through their eﬀect on the (revenue-share weighted) product price, but have no direct eﬀect on demand
at the product level. For example, if in a particular month domestic ciprofloxacin is available only in small
bottles, which are more expensive than the big bottles, this aﬀects demand only because consumers eﬀectively
face a higher price for domestic ciprofloxacin (in other words, they would be indiﬀerent between small and
big bottles, if it were not for the higher price of the former). While this seems a reasonable assumption
in the context of some presentations (e.g., bottles), it is more questionable for others, for example syrups
versus pills, where consumers may have a true preference for one presentation. To examine the robustness
of our results in this case, we also considered an alternative identification strategy, in which instead of
instrumenting, we constructed product prices using fixed weights (i.e., the average over our sample period
revenue share of each SKU), and then applied OLS. The results based on this estimation approach were very
similar to the ones we obtain with instrumental variables, but significantly diﬀerent from the ones we obtain
when running OLS with prices constructed using current shares. This confirms our view that simultaneity
bias is driven here by the use of current SKU revenue shares in the construction of product prices.
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ables in the estimation, it is diﬃcult to derive standard errors for the parameter estimates
directly. Instead, we use the bootstrap method. To maintain the market structure, we
randomly sample the periods (with replacement) and use the same periods for all prod-
ucts. Regarding the optimal number of bootstrap repetitions, ideally one would follow the
three-step method proposed by Andrews et al (2000). However, empirical evidence sug-
gests that one rarely needs more than 200 replications to estimate the standard errors. 25
Accordingly, we generate 200 bootstrap samples (with replacement) based on the original
data, and estimate the standard errors using the standard errors of the bootstrap sample
estimates.
The estimation of the top level AIDS system is similar. The constraints imposed on this
top-level demand system are adding up, homogeneity and symmetry. Again bootstrapping
is used to obtain the standard errors of the parameter estimates.
4.5. The counterfactual scenarios
In assessing the eﬀects of patent enforcement we start by focusing on the most extreme
case, in which compulsory licensing is not an option, and foreign firms are not subject to
price controls. We use the results from the analysis of this case as a benchmark. In reality,
the outcome of the WTO negotiations is more likely to involve some constraints on the
monopoly power of foreign firms selling patented products in developing countries, such as
price caps or compulsory licencing. Our framework can easily accommodate these cases, as
will become apparent in the next subsection.
We now focus on the eﬀects of potential patent enforcement in the quinolone segment.
We consider several scenarios that vary in the number of domestic products that will be
removed from the market. In particular, we consider the following scenarios:
• withdrawal of the domestic ciprofloxacin product group only
• withdrawal of the domestic norfloxacin product group only
• withdrawal of the domestic ofloxacin product group only
• withdrawal of the domestic sparfloxacin product group only
• withdrawal of the domestic ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin and ofloxacin product groups
• withdrawal of the domestic ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin and sparfloxacin product groups
• withdrawal of the domestic ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and sparfloxacin product groups
• withdrawal of the domestic norfloxacin, ofloxacin and sparfloxacin product groups
• withdrawal of all four domestic quinolone product groups
As the above list suggests, we proceed from analyzing the eﬀects of single product
withdrawal to the analysis of eliminating the entire domestic segment. This approach was
25See Efron and Tibshirani (1993).
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motivated by early empirical results that indicated that the existence and extent of com-
petition from domestic firms has a significant bearing on the predicted eﬀects of patent
enforcement; that is, our predictions regarding prices and welfare vary substantially de-
pending on how many domestic products are aﬀected by patent enforcement. In addition,
our early results indicated that the treatment of domestic ciprofloxacin, a product group
with a significant share (53%) of the quinolone market, has a significant impact on the re-
sults. Accordingly, we consider various scenarios depending on whether or not the domestic
ciprofloxacin product group is aﬀected by patent enforcement.
4.6. Computation of virtual prices and new equilibrium prices
The first step in the counterfactual analysis is to derive the new equilibrium prices under
patent enforcement26. In this context there are two sets of prices that are relevant. The
first set consists of the virtual prices of those (domestic) products that will not be available
once TRIPS is put in eﬀect. To calculate these virtual prices we set the revenue shares (or
alternatively the quantities) of the relevant products equal to zero. The second set of prices
consists of the prices of those products that remain in the market. In deriving these prices
we assume (consistent with the assumption of Bertrand competition) that firms reoptimize
in response to the policy change, and set new prices, taking the prices of all other firms
as given. Of course, at the equilibrium all prices change in response to the fact that some
domestic products are no longer present27. The new equilibrium prices for products that
remain in the market are thus computed by utilizing the first order conditions of profit
maximizing firms, into which the virtual prices of the eliminated products are substituted.
Hence, to compute the new equilibrium prices we solve an equation system of the following
form:
• For products i that are withdrawn from the market:
0 = αi + γii lnp
V
it +Σj∈D10i [γi,10 lnp
0
jt] +Σj∈D01i [γi,01 ln p
0
jt] (4.23)
+Σj∈D00i [γi,00 ln p
0








• For products k that remain in the market:
p
0











26Of course, until product patents are in fact introduced, these prices will not be observable. Note also
that we are assuming here that the range of products that are available will not change with the introduction
of patents.
27As mentioned above, this approach abstracts from the existence of remaining price controls or other
government regulations that would impose constraints on the firms’ profit maximization problem. How-
ever, incorporating such controls in our analysis is straightforward. If remaining firms face price controls,
their prices are dictated by their marginal costs plus a predetermined markup, rather than the first order
conditions.
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In the above equations pVit denotes the virtual price of the product that is removed from the
market, while p
0
jt denotes the updated prices of all other products. In the case of multiple
product withdrawal, the p
0
jt gets replaced by p
V
jt, that is the virtual prices of the products
that are being eliminated. Note that when solving for the virtual prices we account for
the fact that both the price index for quinolones PQt, and the expenditure allocated to
this sub-segment XQt, need to be updated to reflect the fact that as a result of the price
changes there may be substitution away from this sub-segment. To obtain the new quinolone
expenditure X
0
Qt and the new price index P
0
Qt, we use the estimates and formulas for the
higher level AIDS system. In equation (4.24), ck refers to the average (over the sample
period) marginal cost for product k that we have obtained from the previous estimation







refers to the unconditional own price-elasticity for product k,
which is a function of the eliminated products’ virtual prices and the remaining products’
new equilibrium prices.
4.7. Welfare assessment
The simulation of the new equilibrium under patent protection can provide important in-
sights into how consumers and firms will respond to the removal of domestic products in
the market (for example, which products consumers will substitute towards; which prices
will increase the most, etc..). To get a more precise idea of how people’s well-being will be
ultimately aﬀected by TRIPS, we compute as a last step in our analysis the welfare eﬀects
of the policy change. Social welfare is defined as the sum of domestic firm profits, and con-
sumer welfare. The change in domestic profits can easily be calculated by comparing the
domestic firm (variable) profits at the pre-TRIPS prices to the profits these firms will realize
at the new simulated prices. Although foreign firm profits do not count in domestic welfare
calculations, we also compute the eﬀects of patent enforcement on foreign firm profits, to
get an idea of how large the expected benefits of TRIPS for these firms are. This provides
in some sense an indirect way of assessing whether the claims that patent enforcement in
countries like India will lead to more research on developing-country-specific diseases (such
as malaria) have any validity; if, for example, we find that the eﬀect of patent enforcement
on the foreign firm profits realized in India is small in magnitude, it is unlikely that foreign
firms will engage in more developing-country-specific research in response to TRIPS.
The eﬀects on consumer welfare are slightly more involved to compute. We measure
changes in consumer welfare by the compensating variation (CV), defined as the additional
expenditure that consumers need in order to achieve the same utility level as before patent
enforcement at the new prices. Specifically, let P 0 denote the price vector before patent
enforcement, P
0
the simulated price vector post-TRIPS (that we obtained using the methods
described in the previous subsection), u0 the utility attained by consumers before TRIPS,
and E(u, P ) the higher level expenditure function given by equation (4.18). Then the
compensating variation is given by:
CV = E(u0, P
0
)−E(u0, P 0 ) (4.25)
where E(u0, P
0
) and E(u0, P 0 ) are computed according to (4.18).28 Note that the CV as
computed in (4.25) represents the combination of three eﬀects:
28Note that in this calculation the utility u refers to the utility consumers derive from the consumption of
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• The pure product variety eﬀect; that is the eﬀect that arises because one or more prod-
ucts are not available to consumers anymore, holding the prices of all other remaining
products, and the total expenditure on the quinolone sub-segment XQ constant.
• The expenditure switching eﬀect; that is the eﬀect arising from substitution away from
quinolones, and towards other sub-segments of the anti-biotics market, again holding
the prices of all other remaining products constant.
• The reduced competition eﬀect; that is the eﬀect that arises because the firms remain-
ing in the market adjust (increase) their prices in response to the removal of domestic
products.
From both an analytical and a policy point of view, it is desirable to assess how large
each of the above eﬀects is. Accordingly, we decompose the total eﬀect on consumer welfare
(the CV as given by equation (4.25)), using the following procedure:
To get the pure product variety eﬀect, we compute virtual prices for the products that
are removed from the market holding the quinolone expenditure XQ and the prices of all
other products fixed. Let us call the resulting price vector P 1. Then the pure product
variety eﬀect is represented by E(u0, P 1)−E(u0, P 0 ).
To compute the expenditure switching eﬀect, we compute another set of virtual prices,
again holding the prices of all remaining products fixed, but letting quinolone expenditure
adjust in response to the new price index for the quinolone segment (given that the prices
of the remaining products remain fixed, the change in the price index arises only because
of the removal of one or more domestic products). Let us call the so-computed price vector
P 2. The expenditure switching eﬀect is then E(u0, P 2)−E(u0, P 1).
Finally, the reduced competition eﬀect arising from higher prices for the remaining
products is computed as the residual change in the compensating variation once the product
variety and expenditure eﬀects have been accounted for, that is E(u0, P
0
)−E(u0, P 2), where
the price vector P
0
is computed according to the formulas (4.23) and (4.24) to reflect the
adjustment of prices to the new regime.
5. Results
5.1. The structure of demand
Table 8 displays the results from estimation of the lower-level AIDS system characterizing
demand patterns within the quinolone sub-segment. For ease of interpretation, rather than
report the coeﬃcient estimates directly, we report the implied conditional (i.e., constant-
expenditure) price and expenditure elasticities evaluated at the average expenditure shares
for each of the product groups.
The first column of Table 8 reports the own price elasticities we estimate, which are, in
all but one case, negative and highly significant. The one exception is the foreign norfloxacin
product group–whose share of quinolone sales is 0.07%–for which we estimate a positive
systemic anti-biotics. This is the utility that we keep constant at u0. We thus ignore potential substitution
away from antibiotics altogether as a result of patent enforcement. However, we believe that such substitution
eﬀects are likely to be small in practice.
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but insignificant own price elasticity. For the remaining product groups, demand appears
to be highly elastic, with the estimated elasticities being lower than -2 in four out of the
six cases. The magnitude of the own-price elasticities matches the features of the Indian
pharmaceutical market mentioned earlier, which would suggest that Indian consumers are
likely to be quite price-sensitive.29
The estimated expenditure elasticities appear in the last column. These are all positive,
indicating that the demand for all the product groups is normal. Domestic ciprofloxacin
and norfloxacin, and foreign ofloxacin appear to be “luxuries”, with expenditure elasticities
greater than 1. This suggests that these product groups capture a disproportionate share
of incremental sales when consumers choose to spend more in the quinolone sub-segment.
In the case of domestic ciprofloxacin and norfloxacin this might be explained by the large
number of products (90 and 48 respectively) and firms (75 and 40 respectively) that are
represented in these two product groups.
The middle columns display the estimated cross-price elasticities. As one might perhaps
expect for products within a therapeutic sub-segment, these are positive in all but two cases.
What is striking however, is how large, positive and significant the cross-price elasticities
between diﬀerent domestic product groups are–in fact, for norfloxacin and ofloxacin we
estimate that domestic product groups containing diﬀerent molecules are closer substitutes
for one another than product groups that contain the same molecule but are produced by
firms of diﬀerent domestic/foreign status. In contrast, for ciprofloxacin (the molecule with
the largest revenue share) we estimate a large positive cross-price elasticity between the
domestic and foreign versions.
The fact that domestic products appear to be close substitutes for other domestic prod-
ucts that contain diﬀerent molecules truly represents an “empirical” finding in the sense
that we do not impose it through any of our assumptions regarding the demand function.
The question that naturally arises then, is what might explain this finding. While we can-
not formally address this question, anecdotal accounts in various industry studies suggest
that the explanation may lie in the diﬀerences between domestic and foreign firms in the
structure and coverage of retail distribution networks.
Distribution networks for pharmaceuticals in India are typically organized in a hierar-
chical fashion. Pharmaceutical companies deal mainly with carrying and forwarding (C&F)
agents, in many instances regionally based, who each supply a network of stockists (whole-
salers). These stockists in turn deal with the retail pharmacists through whom retail sales
ultimately occur.30 The market share enjoyed by a particular pharmaceutical product there-
fore depends in part on the number of retail pharmacists who stock the product. And it
is here that there appears to be a distinction between domestic firms and multinational
subsidiaries. In particular, the retail reach of domestic firms, as a group, tends to be much
29 In developed economies, elasticities of this magnitude have typically only been found for generic drugs
(and even then, only rarely) or among consumers who lack health insurance.
30There are estimated to be some 300,000 retail pharmacists in India. On average stockists deal with
about 75 retailers (ICRA (1999)). There are naturally variations in this structure, and a host of specific
exclusive dealing and other arrangements exist in practice. Pharmaceutical firms also maintain networks of
medical representatives whose main function is to market the company’s products to doctors who do the
actual prescribing of drugs. In some instances, firms do sell directly to the doctors who then become the
“retailer” as far as patients are concerned, but these are relatively rare.
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more comprehensive than that of multinational subsidiaries (ICRA (1999)).31
There appear to be two reasons for this. The first is that many of the larger Indian firms,
because they have a much larger portfolio of products over which to spread the associated
fixed costs, typically have more extensive networks of medical representatives. The second
is simply that there are many more domestic firms (and products) on the market. At the
retail level this would imply that local pharmacists might be more likely to stock domestic
products containing two diﬀerent molecules, say ciprofloxacin and norfloxacin, than they
would domestic and foreign versions of the same molecule. To the extent that patients (or
their doctors) are willing to substitute across molecules in order to save on transport or
search costs (e.g., going to another pharmacy to check whether a particular foreign product
is in stock), in aggregate data we would expect to find precisely the substitution patterns
that we report in Table 8.
Whether or not the particular explanation we provide above is the correct one, the high
degree of substitutability between domestic product groups turns out to have important
implications for the welfare calculations. We discuss these in more detail below when we
present the results of the counterfactual welfare analysis.
Table 9 displays the results from estimation of the higher-level AIDS system charac-
terizing demand patterns across the systemic anti-bacterials segment. Again, we report
the results in the form of implied price and expenditure elasticities. All of the own price
elasticities are significant and negative. As we would expect, the price elasticity for the
quinolone sub-segment as a whole is, at -1.166, smaller (in absolute value) than the own-
price elasticities of the product groups within the sub-segment.
Estimation of the higher level AIDS system allows us to obtain the unconditional own-
and cross-price elasticities for the quinolone product groups. These are needed both for the
formulation of the supply problem and to capture the strength of the expenditure switching
eﬀect when we simulate the eﬀects of the introduction of patent protection in the quinolone
sub-segment. These unconditional elasticities are displayed in Table 10. They diﬀer only
slightly from the conditional elasticities discussed earlier. Own price elasticities are large
and negative, while all pairs of domestic product groups continue to have large positive
cross-price elasticities.
5.2. Cost and markup estimates
Table 11 displays the marginal costs, markups and profits implied by the price elasticity
estimates of Table 10 for each of the seven product groups. Since we do not have a reliable
estimate of the price elasticity for foreign norfloxacin (the point estimate is positive and
insignificant), we set its marginal cost to be the same as its price. The estimates in Table 11
are calculated assuming that firms set prices to maximize their profits, and price controls
are not binding. During the period covered by our data, two of the four molecules in our
sample, ciprofloxacin and norfloxacin, were nominally under price control. If we were to
assume that the price controls were binding, and that the regulated markup was about
15%, then the profit figures for domestic ciprofloxacin and domestic norfloxacin would be
Rs. 428.4 million and Rs. 94.8 million per year respectively, instead of Rs. 1752.28 and Rs.
31These diﬀerences were also highlighted in conversations that one of the authors had with CEOs and
Managing Directors of several pharmaceutical firms as part of a separate study.
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268.92 million. Because the average prices of foreign ciprofloxacin and foreign norfloxacin
are much lower than those of their domestic counterparts, it is reasonable to assume that
price controls were not binding for them.32 We emphasize however, that the estimates in
Table 11 should be thought of as an upper bound on profits.
The foreign ofloxacin product group is estimated to have the highest markup. But
it is the domestic ciprofloxacin product group that dominates the quinolone sub-segment,
enjoying a markup of over 60% and accounting for nearly 70% of all profits derived within
the sub-segment.
5.3. Counterfactual estimates of the impact on prices and welfare
With estimates of the key demand and cost parameters in hand, we turn to the counter-
factuals. We consider the nine separate scenarios listed in the previous section. All of the
scenarios involve the withdrawal of one or more of the domestic product groups from the
market. Table 12 displays our estimates of the consumer welfare losses that result under
the diﬀerent scenarios. The top panel of Table 12 displays the results in terms of Rs. per
household per year, while the bottom panel presents the estimates in aggregate terms in
Rs. billion per year.
The first column presents our estimates of the consumer welfare losses attributable to
the pure loss of product variety eﬀect, where we fix the prices of all remaining products as
well as the overall expenditure on quinolones while withdrawing one or more of the domestic
product groups. Note that had we not, in our initial specification of the demand system,
allowed for the possibility that consumers might diﬀerentiate between domestic and foreign
products even when they contain the same molecule, this particular component of the loss
of consumer welfare would not have arisen.
The estimates reported in the second column incorporate the expenditure switching
eﬀect on top of the loss of product variety. Here, based upon the price elasticity estimates
from the higher-level AIDS system (Table 10), we adjust (downwards) the expenditures
allocated to the quinolone sub-segment as the composite price of quinolones eﬀectively
increases as a consequence of the higher virtual prices of the domestic product groups
that are withdrawn from the market. Because the estimates in this column are generated
assuming that the prices of the products that remain in the market are not adjusted upwards,
they provide a sense of what consumer losses would be if the introduction of product patents
was coupled with strict price-regulation aimed at maintaining prices at pre-patent levels.
Alternatively, they can be thought of as the relevant welfare numbers if intense competition
among firms within the remaining product groups kept the prices of the products that were
still oﬀered in the market close to the firms’ marginal costs.
In the third column, we consider the somewhat artificial case where the prices of the
remaining products are adjusted upwards as one or more of the domestic product groups
are withdrawn, but expenditures on quinolones are held fixed. And the last column displays
the estimated consumer welfare losses when both cross-segment expenditure-switching and
within-segment upward price adjustments are taken into account.
32The price controls are imposed at the molecule level. Domestic and foreign products sharing the same
molecule should thus have the same prices if price controls were binding.
28
If we compare the results across the first, second and fourth columns, all the counter-
factual scenarios produce qualitatively similar patterns, patterns that are consistent with
what we would expect. Starting from the initial loss of welfare attributable to the loss of
product variety, the option of switching expenditures out of the quinolone sub-segment to
other sub-segments mitigates some of the initial welfare loss. But if we then incorporate the
upward price adjustments that result in response to the reduced competition, the welfare
losses are magnified.
Of particular interest from a policy perspective are the relative magnitudes of these
three eﬀects, which are similar under all the counterfactual scenarios though the absolute
levels vary considerably. First, despite the fact that the demand for quinolones is quite
sensitive to the composite price of quinolones–a price elasticity of -1.166 (see Table 9)–
the cross-sub-segment expenditure switching eﬀects are, in all the cases, small (in absolute
value terms) relative to the other two eﬀects. For instance, under the scenario where all the
domestic quinolone product groups are withdrawn from the market, the overall consumer
welfare loss of Rs. 154.87 per household per year can be decomposed into an initial loss of
Rs. 110.82 (71%) attributable to the loss of product variety, a slight reduction in this initial
loss of Rs. 6.97 (-5%), from Rs. 110.82 to Rs. 103.85, because of expenditure switching,
and a subsequent additional loss of Rs. 51.02 (33%), from Rs. 103.85 to Rs. 154.87, because
of the reduced competition and consequent price increases.
The basic claim made by proponents of TRIPS is that any adverse impacts on consumer
welfare from the introduction of a product patent in a particular market will be mitigated
by the availability of close therapeutic substitutes. The relatively minor role that cross-
sub-segment expenditure switching appears to play suggests that for this claim to be valid,
there need to be unpatented (i.e., patent-expired) substitutes available within fairly nar-
rowly defined therapeutic categories. Since the extent to which this is true will vary across
therapeutic segments, the impact of TRIPS is likely to be correspondingly variegated, a
point emphasized by Maskus (2000, p.163).
The relative magnitudes of the two other eﬀects varies with the initial market share of
the domestic product groups being withdrawn — if the initial market share is large as is the
case with domestic ciprofloxacin, the fraction of the overall welfare loss that is attributable
to loss of variety is also large — but in all except one case the loss of variety remains the more
important of the two components of the overall consumer welfare loss. Under almost all
the counterfactual scenarios we consider, the welfare loss due to loss of variety constitutes
more than 50% of the overall welfare loss and in some instances it is as high as 70%.
Price regulation and compulsory licensing are two of the most widely mentioned post-
TRIPS policy options available to governments of developing economies. There is an ongoing
debate about how much leeway governments should have to introduce these options and
about the relative eﬃcacy of the two options in limiting price increases. The magnitude
and importance of the welfare losses we estimate from the loss of product variety suggest
that there may be an independent role for compulsory licensing in addition to or in lieu of
price regulation for the sole purpose of mitigating the loss of product variety.
Turning next to a comparison of the consumer welfare losses under the diﬀerent scenarios
the most striking result is that the estimated loss of consumer welfare (Rs. 29.7 billion)
from the simultaneous withdrawal of all four domestic product groups–the scenario that
most closely resembles what is likely to happen under TRIPS–is more than three times the
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sum of the estimated losses from the four separate scenarios in each of which only one of the
domestic product groups is withdrawn. What this very clearly indicates is that past studies
that have estimated the aggregate eﬀects of patent protection by adding up the losses,
estimated separately, in each of a number of patentable markets may have substantially
underestimated the magnitude of the consumer welfare losses from the introduction of
pharmaceutical product patents.
The result that the simultaneous withdrawal of all domestic products magnifies the
scale of the welfare losses is driven by our estimates of high, positive cross-price elasticities
between domestic products. As noted earlier, these elasticities imply that such products are
close substitutes to one another. Hence, when all four domestic products disappear from the
market, the resulting consumer loss is substantial. In contrast, the welfare losses associated
with the withdrawal of a single domestic product or a subset of domestic products are more
modest; with domestic product groups within the quinolone sub-segment being relatively
good substitutes, if only one of them is withdrawn, consumers switch to the others, and
this limits any welfare losses.
We should note that if, as we speculated above, the high degree of substitutability
between domestic products stems in part from the diﬀerential reach of the distribution
networks of domestic and foreign firms, these estimates may overstate the welfare loss from
the simultaneous withdrawal of all domestic products. That is because, with India becoming
TRIPS compliant, foreign subsidiaries may well choose to expand their product portfolios in
India and simultaneously expand their distribution networks in India, most likely through
joint marketing ventures with Indian firms.33 In this case, the welfare loss from the reduction
in variety would be a purely transitional phenomenon. Over time, foreign products would
be more readily available in local pharmacies throughout India and this would compensate
for the reduction in the number of domestic products. Note however, that even under this
scenario, the component of consumer welfare loss due to upward price adjustment remains.
And a crude calculation based on the estimates in the last row of Table 12 suggests that this
is likely to be significant. In particular, if we subtract from our estimate (Rs. 29.7 billion)
of the overall consumer welfare loss, the component attributable to the reduction in variety
(Rs. 21.3 billion), we are still left with an estimated welfare loss of Rs. 8.4 billion. Given
the size of the welfare loss due to upward price adjustment policymakers may be tempted
to continue the use of price controls and other domestic regulations. However, such policies
would put a limit not only on prices, but also on the incentives of foreign producers to
expand their operations in the Indian market, so that the welfare loss due to the reduction
of product variety could become a permanent phenomenon.
Table 13 documents our estimates of the price increases that would result under the
various counterfactual scenarios. The table reports the price increases for the product
groups, foreign or domestic, that would remain in the market under each of our scenarios.
The product groups that are withdrawn from the market are indicated by the shaded
areas. For these product groups, we have computed “virtual prices”, that is the prices that
would be required for the demand of these drugs to be zero, and employed these estimates
in the counterfactual simulations. Of course, virtual prices are never observed in any
market. We should note however, that most of the virtual price numbers we obtain seem
33Media accounts and interviews with industry sources indicate that such initiatives are increasing in
number.
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a-priori plausible. For scenarios that involve a single product withdrawal and drugs with
small market shares, such as norfloxacin, ofloxacin and sparfloxacin, the virtual prices are
roughly 2 to 3 times higher than the prices we observe for these drugs in our sample period.
In contrast, it takes an 8-fold price increase to drive demand for domestic ciprofloxacin,
the product with the largest market share within quinolones, down to zero. The virtual
prices are however substantially higher in scenarios that involve simultaneous withdrawal
of multiple domestic products, especially if domestic ciprofloxacin is one of them. This is
driven by the large market share of domestic ciprofloxacin, in combination with the large,
positive cross-price elasticities between domestic products.
For the foreign products that would remain in the market, we estimate price increases
between 200% and 750%. This is on the high side of the estimates reported in other studies.
While these numbers are again based on simulations, and thus not observed, we can obtain
a rough idea about their plausibility by comparing them to the prices of the same products
observed in countries “similar” to India, which have had stricter patent laws in the past.
Pakistan is a natural candidate. The similarity between our predictions in Table 13 and the
numbers reported in Lanjouw (1998), p. 39, Table 2, for drugs sold in Pakistan, is striking.
For the drug ciprofloxacin, for example, we predict that the price of the (patented) foreign
products in India would be approximately 8 times higher than it is now (see last row of
Table 13, first column; the relevant scenario here is one where all domestic products are
withdrawn from the market, since this is the situation that most closely resembles Pakistan).
This matches exactly the number reported by Lanjouw (1998) for patented ciprofloxacin in
Pakistan. These comparisons give us confidence that the empirical framework we use as a
basis for conducting counterfactual simulations in India captures the main features of this
market.
Table 14 presents our estimates of the net impact of the withdrawal of one or more
domestic product groups on the collective profits of domestic Indian firms in the quinolone
sub-segment. These numbers are based on our initial estimates of the marginal costs of
production and, depending on the scenario being considered, our estimates of the price
increases that would result from product withdrawal.
Under the scenario where all the domestic product groups are withdrawn from the
market, the net impact equals the gross impact and is simply the loss of the profits initially
enjoyed by domestic firms. Our estimate of this loss, Rs. 2,379 million per year, is reported
in Table 11, and the bottom row of Table 14 reproduces this estimate. In the other cases,
the foregone profits of those domestic firms whose products are withdrawn from the market
are partly or wholly oﬀset by the increased profits of those domestic firms that remain in
the market and benefit from the reduced competition. From Table 14 it can be seen that
this result arises in nearly half the cases (cells).34
Critics of the Indian government’s stance on TRIPS frequently assert that it is motivated
less by concerns about consumer welfare than it is by a desire to protect the domestic phar-
maceutical industry. Whether or not that is the case, the estimates presented in Table 14
indicate that the loss of domestic producer surplus is unlikely to be the biggest consequence
of TRIPS-induced patent protection. First, as just mentioned, there are many scenarios un-
34To be consistent with Table 12, which reported consumer welfare losses as positive numbers, Table 14
reports foregone profits as positive numbers. Thus the cases where the collective profits of domestic Indian
firms actually increase are those for which negative numbers are reported.
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der which the collective profits of domestic firms would actually go up, though there always
is a segment that would be adversely aﬀected.35 Second, even when the collective profits
do go down (just over half the cases (cells)), a comparison with Table 12 indicates that the
loss of consumer welfare is much greater in every instance. And under the scenario where
the collective loss of profits is the greatest and there are no winners among the domestic
Indian firms, the loss incurred by producers–Rs. 2.3 billion on an annualized basis–pales
in comparison to the decrease in consumer welfare reported in Table 12 under the same
scenario–Rs. 29.7 billion annually.36
Adding up the estimates of consumer welfare losses from Table 12 and producer losses
from Table 14 we get estimates of the total welfare losses to the Indian economy. These
are reported in Table 15. At the upper bound we estimate that in the absence of any price
regulation or compulsory licensing the total annual welfare losses to the Indian economy from
the withdrawal of just four domestic product groups in the quinolone sub-segment would be
on the order of Rs. 32 billion, or about 118% of the sales of the entire systemic anti-bacterials
segment in 2000. At the then prevailing exchange rate this translates into a figure of U.S.
$713 million. Of this amount, foregone profits of domestic producers constitute roughly Rs.
2.3 billion, or U.S. $50 million (ca. 7% of the total welfare loss). The overwhelming portion
of the total welfare loss therefore derives from the loss of consumer welfare.
A mid-range estimate–obtained assuming there are no upward price adjustments as a
result of product withdrawals–would be Rs. 22.2 billion or about U.S. $495 million per
year for the scenario involving withdrawal of all four domestic quinolone product groups.
And lastly, if we assume that the welfare losses due to the reduction in variety that would
result from patent protection are a purely transitional phenomenon and subtract these from
our upper bound estimates, we obtain a lower bound estimate of Rs. 7.6 billion (=32.1-
23.6) or $169 million annually. Though only about a fourth of our upper bound estimate, in
absolute terms this lower bound estimate is still very large, representing 28% of antibiotic
sales in 2000.
Finally, Table 16 presents our estimates of the profit gains realized by foreign producers
as a result of patent introduction. These estimates indicate that the total profit gains to
foreign producers would be only about Rs. 2.6 billion or approximately U.S. $57 million
per year. To put this number in perspective, sales of Cipro, the main patented ciprofloxacin
product of Bayer, were roughly U.S. $1.6 billion in 2000 (Hensley (2001)). While we do
not want to put too much emphasis on these results, they do suggest that the promise of
patent-induced profits in less developed economies is unlikely to shift the R&D priorities of
global pharmaceutical companies. The development of new treatments for the diseases that
disproportionately aﬄict the populations of poor (mostly tropical) economies and increased
access to essential medicines are, therefore, likely to depend critically on publicly funded
35This may in part explain why the Indian pharmaceutical industry has been divided in its reaction to
TRIPS. The Organization of Pharmaceutical Producers of India, which includes among its members most
of the leading Indian firms as well the subsidiaries of foreign MNCs, is openly supportive of strengthening
India’s intellectual property rights regime (http://www.indiaoppi.com/). Other industry associations such as
the Indian Drug Manufacturers Association with memberships drawn from smaller firms tend to be more
critical of TRIPS.
36There are other factors as well that might serve to mitigate the losses experienced by Indian firms, among
them the possibility of joint ventures with, or contract manufacturing for multinationals. Such collaborations
are increasing in frequency in the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
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eﬀorts such as those proposed by Sachs (2002) and Ganslandt et al (2001).
6. Conclusion
The results of our analysis suggest that concerns about the potentially adverse welfare ef-
fects of TRIPS in developing countries may have some basis. Specifically, we estimate that
in the quinolone sub-segment of the systemic anti-bacterials segment alone, patent enforce-
ment would result in a total annual welfare loss of U.S. $713 million for the Indian economy.
Of this amount, only 7% account for the forgone profits of domestic (Indian) pharmaceu-
tical firms. Hence, we do not find much support for the claim that TRIPS would have
detrimental eﬀects on the Indian pharmaceutical industry. In fact, under some scenarios
we find that the profits of domestic firms may even increase; this happens because, when
certain domestic products become unavailable as a result of patent enforcement, consumers
substitute towards other domestic products containing diﬀerent molecules, rather than for-
eign products containing the same molecule. This diﬀerential eﬀect of TRIPS on domestic
firms’ profits may partly explain the divided position of the Indian pharmaceutical industry
regarding TRIPS.
With respect to the subsidiaries of foreign multinationals, we estimate the profits of
these firms to rise by approximately U.S. $57 per year when patents are enforced. While we
certainly do not attempt to draw any conclusions about the relationship between intellectual
property rights protection, and research and innovation, we note that this number represents
a very small fraction of the annual sales of big pharmaceutical firms in this sub-segment.
Thus, it seems unlikely that patent-induced profits in developing countries would shift the
research priorities of global pharmaceutical companies.
By far, the biggest eﬀects of TRIPS concern the Indian consumers, for whom we es-
timate substantial welfare losses. The losses increase in the number of domestic products
that are aﬀected by TRIPS. The worst case scenario involves simultaneous withdrawal of
all domestic product groups in the quinolone sub-segment. In contrast, when only one
domestic product, or a subset of domestic products are withdrawn, the consumer losses
are modest. This pattern is driven by the empirical finding that domestic products are
viewed by Indian consumers as close substitutes; accordingly, the existence of some degree
of domestic competition has a big impact on consumer well-being.
Finally, our decomposition of the total consumer loss into a “product variety” eﬀect,
an “expenditure switching” eﬀect, and a “price adjustment” eﬀect, has interesting policy
implications. We find that a substantial fraction of the total welfare loss is attributable to
the loss of variety. This suggests a potentially independent role of compulsory licensing in
addition to, or in lieu of price regulation, for the sole purpose of mitigating the loss of product
variety eﬀect. Even if one considers this eﬀect to be only a transitional phenomenon that
will diminish in importance as foreign firms respond to TRIPS enforcement by expanding
their product portfolios and distribution networks, the welfare loss due to upward price
adjustment remains substantial. The “price adjustment” component of welfare loss could
potentially be mitigated by appropriate price controls or other regulations. However in this
case, the incentives of multinationals to expand their operations in the Indian market would
become questionable, and the welfare loss attributable to the loss of product variety could
become a permanent eﬀect. Lastly, we find that expenditure switching across sub-segments
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has a limited role in containing consumer welfare loss. The claim of TRIPS proponents that
any adverse eﬀects arising from the introduction of a patent in a particular market would be
mitigated by the availability of close therapeutic substitutes is thus only valid if there are
patent-expired substitutes available within fairly narrowly defined therapeutic categories.
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Table 1 
 
Top twenty firms by domestic retail pharmaceutical sales in India 
Year 
1971 1981 2001 
 
 
Rank Company Origin Company Origin Company Origin 
1 Sarabhai Dom Glaxo For Glaxo SKB For 
2 Glaxo For Hoechst For Ranbaxy Dom 
3 Pfizer For Pfizer For Cipla Dom 
4 Alembic Dom Alembic Dom Nicholas Piramal Dom 
5 Hoechst For Geoffrey Manner For Aventis For 
6 Lederle For Burroughs Wellcome For Sun Dom 
7 Ciba For Ranbaxy Dom Dr. Reddy’s Dom 
8 May & Baker For Boots For Zydus Cadila Dom 
9 Parke Davis For German Remedies For Knoll For 
10 Abbott For Richardson Hindustan For Pfizer For 
11 Sharp & Dome For Parke Davis For Wockhardt Dom 
12 Sudrid Geigy For Warner-Hindustan For Alkem Dom 
13 Unichem Dom Roche For Lupin Dom 
14 East India Dom Merck, Sharp & Dome For Novartis For 
15 Sandoz For Cynamid For Aristo Dom 
16 Deys Dom Unichem Dom Pharma Marketing Dom 
17 Boots For Cadilla Dom Torrent Dom 
18 T.C.F. Dom Standard Dom Alembic Dom 
19 Warner Hindustan For E. Merck For Cadila Pharmaceutical Dom 
20 John Wyeth For East India Dom USV Dom 
 
Year  
1970 1981 1991 2000 
Foreign subsidiaries’ share of domestic retail sales (%) 75-90 60-75 49-55 28-35 
Notes: If companies are ranked in terms of overall sales (including exports), nine out of the top ten firms in 2001 
were of domestic origin. 
Notes: Precise estimates of the share of foreign subsidiaries in domestic retail sales are hard to come by because 
of the scarcity of comprehensive industry-wide data. The figures in this table represent rough estimates put together 
by compiling data from multiple sources. 
Sources: For 1971, Redwood (1994) and ICRA (2000) both of which rely on data from ORG-MARG; for 1981, 




Comparing the health sector in low-income and developed economies 
 
 India Pakistan Canada U.S.A. 
Information on health expenditures 
Total health expenditures as % of GDP 4.9 4.1 9.1 13.0 
Per-capita total health expenditures (US $) 23 18 2058 4499 
Public health expenditures as % of total 17.8 22.9 72.0 44.3 
Private health expenditures as % of total 82.2 77.1 28.0 55.7 
Out-of-pocket expenditures as % of total 82.2 77.1 15.5 15.3 
 
Top ten leading causes of burden of disease in 1998: all ages 
India U.S.A. and Canada 
Cause DALYs (000) Cause DALYs (000) 
Acute lower respiratory infection 24,806 Ischaemic heart disease 2,955 
Perinatal conditions 23,316 Unipolar major depression 2,511 
Diarrhoeal diseases 22,005 Alcohol dependence 1,736 
Ischaemic heart disease 11,697 Road traffic injuries 1,670 
Falls 10,897 Cerebrovascular disease 1,651 
Unipolar major depression 9,679 Osteoarthritis 1,029 
Tuberculosis 7,578 Diabetes mellitus 1,017 
Congenital abnormalities 7,454 Trachea/bronchus/lung cancers 996 
Road traffic injuries 7,204 Dementias 940 
Measles 6,474 Self-inflicted injuries 858 
Sources: World Health Report, WHO(2002). 








Comparing the Indian pharmaceuticals market to the world market: 
Shares of major therapeutic segments in retail sales 
 
Share of retail sales (%) 
World: 2001 India: 2000 
Therapeutic segment 
Rank Share(%) Rank Share(%) 
Cardiovascular system 1 19.6 4 8.0 
Central nervous system (CNS) 2 16.9 6 6.7 
Alimentary tract and metabolism 3 15.3 1 23.6 
Respiratory system 4 9.5 3 10.4 
Anti-infectives 5 9.0 2 23.0 
Musculo-skeletal 6 6.1 5 7.3 
Genito-urinary 7 5.7 9 3.1 
Cytostatics and immunosuppressants 8 4.0 13 0.1 
Dermatologicals 9 3.3 7 5.6 
Blood and blood-forming agents 10 3.1 8 3.9 
Sensory organs 11 2.1 10 1.6 
Diagnostic agents 12 1.8 12 0.1 
Systemic hormonal products 13 1.6 11 1.5 
Others including parasitology . 2.3 . 5.4 
Source: World sales shares from IMS World Drug Purchases—Retail Pharmacies, IMS Drug Monitor, 2001. Indian 

























Non-penicillinase producing    x  x x x x 
Penicillinase-producing    x  x x x x 
Streptococcus bovis 
Serious infections   x    x x  
Uncomplicated urinary tract infection   x     x x 
 
Streptococcus pneumoniae  x  x  x x x x 
Gram-negative cocci 
Neisseria meningitidis  x  x   x   
Neisseria gonorrhaoeae 
Non-beta-lactamase producing   x x x  x  x 
 
Beta-lactamase producing   x x x    x 
Gram-negative bacilli 
Acinetobacter spp.   x x x    x 
Brucella spp. x    x   x x 
Campylobacter jejuni x     x  x x 
Enterobacter spp.    x   x x x 
Escherichia coli 
Uncomplicated urinary tract infection x  X x x    x 
Systemic infection   X x    x x 
Francisella tularensis x x      x x 
Haemophilus influenzae 
Meningitis  x X x x    x 
Other infections   X x x    x 
Klebisiella pneumonia x x  x x   x x 
Legionella spp. x    x x   x 
Proteus mirabillis   X x x   x  
Other proteus spp.   X x x   x x 
Providencia spp.   X x x   x x 
Pseudomonas aeruginosa    x   x x x 
Salmonella spp.   X x x    x 
Serratia marcescens   X x   x x x 
Shigella spp.   X  x    x 
 
Yersinia pestis x x      x x 
Anaerobic bacteria 
Anaerobic streptococci x x  X  x x   
Bacteroides spp. 
Oropharyngeal strains x x X X  X x   
Gastrointestinal strains  x X X  X x   
 
Clostridium spp. x x    X    
Notes: An “x” in a cell indicates that at least one member of the family of drugs indicated in the column heading is listed as the anti-microbial drug of choice or as 
an alternative agent for the treatment of the bacterial infection indicated in the row heading.  




All India sales share of and expenditures on various sub-segments  
within the systemic anti-bacterials therapeutic segment 
2000 
Therapeutic sub-segment Share (%) of sales of  
systemic anti-bacterials: 2000 
Sales (Rs. millions): 
2000 
Tetracycline, doxycycline and combinations 5.0 1,367 
Chloramphenicols and combinations 1.7 460 
Ampicillin, amoxycillin, cloxicillin 24.1 6,631 
Cephalosporins 27.9 7,671 
Trimethoprim and combinations 3.3 903 
Macrolides 10.6 2,913 
Penicillins 2.5 685 
Other anti-biotics including aminoglycosides 4.2 1,158 
Quinolones and fluoroquinolones 20.8 5,722 
 





The fluoroquinolones sub-segment  
 









Ciprofloxacin  53.0 2.7 3,030 156 
Norfloxacin 11.2 0.1 640 3 
Ofloxacin 11.6 3.1 665 177 
Sparfloxacin 10.8 0.1 620 4 
     
Lomefloxacin 1.5 . 86 . 
Pefloxacin 1.3 0.1 72 5 
Levofloxacin 0.0 . 0 . 





Basic information about the four fluoroquinolone molecules 
 
 Ciprofloxacin Norfloxacin Ofloxacin Sparfloxacin 
 
U.S. or European patent-holder Bayer Merck Ortho-McNeil Rhone-Poulenc 
Year of U.S. patent expiry 2003 1998 2003 2010 
Year of US-FDA approval 1987 1986 1990 1996 
Year first introduced in India 1989 1988 1990 1996 
 
No. of domestic Indian firms 75 40 17 25 
No. of foreign subsidiaries 8 2 2 1 
No. of products of domestic firms 90 48 21 30 
No. of products of foreign subsidiaries 10 2 2 1 
 
Sales weighted average price per-unit API of products produced by:  
Domestic Indian firms 11.23 9.04 88.73 78.11 





Estimates of demand patterns within the quinolone sub-segment  
from lower-level AIDS system: 
Implied conditional price and expenditure elasticities 
 
Elasticity with respect to: 
Prices of 
foreign product groups 
Prices of  
domestic product groups 
Product 
group 




-4.812* 0.016 0.040 4.140* 0.149 0.067 0.023 0.378Foreign 
ciprofloxacin (1.526) (0.063) (0.061) (1.800) (0.094) (0.062) (0.057) (0.381) 
0.610 1.631 0.621 1.966 -9.150 1.785 1.769 0.767Foreign 
norfloxacin (2.521) (1.755) (2.502) (2.465) (5.892) (2.216) (2.196) (0.792) 
0.016 0.015 -1.343* -0.046 0.025 0.177 0.047 1.109*Foreign 
ofloxacin (0.058) (0.058) (0.348) (0.111) (0.059) (0.333) (0.052) (0.113) 
0.174* 0.002 -0.004 -1.617* 0.074* 0.096* 0.108* 1.167*Domestic 
ciprofloxacin (0.075) (0.003) (0.003) (0.100) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.027) 
0.011 -0.051 0.006 0.366* -2.359* 0.454* 0.462* 1.113*Domestic 
norfloxacin (0.013) (0.032) (0.013) (0.069) (0.163) (0.054) (0.055) (0.063) 
0.010 0.013 0.068 0.869* 0.667* -2.920* 0.604* 0.688*Domestic 
ofloxacin (0.017) (0.016) (0.105) (0.107) (0.072) (0.219) (0.065) (0.086) 
0.006 0.012 0.036* 1.055* 0.650* 0.568* -2.701* 0.373*Domestic 
sparfloxacin (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.111) (0.069) (0.060) (0.186) (0.080) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities calculated at average revenue shares.  Asterisk denotes 













Estimates of demand patterns within the systemic anti-bacterials segment  
from the higher-level AIDS system:  































-1.155* -0.209* 1.043* -0.279* -0.761* 0.210* 0.127* -0.017 1.042*Tetracyline and 
related (0.064) (0.067) (0.156) (0.119) (0.099) (0.092) (0.059) (0.207) (0.074) 
-0.685* -1.940* -2.769* 2.275* 0.886* -1.094* 0.144 1.636* 1.546*Chloramphenicols 
 (0.200) (0.292) (0.596) (0.444) (0.368) (0.409) (0.214) (0.775) (0.243) 
0.240* -0.172* -1.187* -0.310* 0.389* 0.251* 0.248* -0.180* 0.721*Ampicillin and 
amoxycillin (0.035) (0.042) (0.126) (0.056) (0.098) (0.063) (0.068) (0.076) (0.028) 
-0.088* 0.213* -0.547* -0.748* -0.245* 0.135* -0.063† 0.154* 1.190*Cephalosporins 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.077) (0.074) (0.045) (0.052) (0.043) (0.077) (0.041) 
-1.009* 0.396* 2.466* -1.076* -1.130† -1.232* -0.410* 1.226* 0.769*Trimethoprim 
combinations (0.129) (0.156) (0.635) (0.210) (0.630) (0.309) (0.207) (0.377) (0.106) 
0.104* -0.155* 0.493* 0.271* -0.442* -0.959* -0.131* -0.147 0.966*Macrolides 
 (0.042) (0.063) (0.137) (0.082) (0.105) (0.121) (0.065) (0.148) (0.045) 
0.696* 0.257 5.974* -0.797 -1.442* -1.203* -2.873* -0.391 -0.222Other penicillins 
 (0.278) (0.335) (1.623) (0.713) (0.768) (0.671) (0.613) (1.244) (0.281) 
-0.014 0.127* -0.335* 0.121* 0.191* -0.103 -0.036 -1.166* 1.215*Quinolones 
 (0.045) (0.059) (0.083) (0.059) (0.064) (0.070) (0.057) (0.102) (0.035) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities calculated at average revenue shares. Asterisk denotes significance at 5% 













Implied unconditional price and expenditure elasticities  
within the quinolones sub-segment 
Elasticity with respect to: 
Prices of 
foreign product groups 
Prices of  
domestic product groups 
Product 
group 




-4.813* 0.016 0.042 4.192* 0.159 0.069 0.020 0.378Foreign 
ciprofloxacin (1.527) (0.063) (0.061) (1.831) (0.100) (0.062) (0.057) (0.381) 
0.610 1.631 0.622 1.986 -9.146 1.786 1.768 0.767Foreign 
norfloxacin (2.521) (1.755) (2.500) (2.499) (5.897) (2.216) (2.195) (0.792) 
0.016 0.015 -1.343* -0.055 0.023 0.177 0.047 1.109*Foreign 
ofloxacin (0.058) (0.058) (0.349) (0.119) (0.060) (0.333) (0.052) (0.113) 
0.174* 0.002 -0.005 -1.631* 0.071* 0.096* 0.109* 1.167*Domestic 
ciprofloxacin (0.075) (0.003) (0.003) (0.103) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.027) 
0.011 -0.051 0.005 0.356* -2.361* 0.453* 0.462* 1.113*Domestic 
norfloxacin (0.013) (0.032) (0.013) (0.072) (0.163) (0.054) (0.055) (0.063) 
0.010 0.013 0.070 0.895* 0.673* -2.919* 0.603* 0.688*Domestic 
ofloxacin (0.017) (0.016) (0.105) (0.113) (0.072) (0.219) (0.064) (0.086) 
0.005 0.012 0.038* 1.107* 0.661* 0.570* -2.703* 0.373*Domestic 
sparfloxacin (0.019) (0.014) (0.015) (0.118) (0.070) (0.061) (0.187) (0.080) 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses. Elasticities calculated at average revenue shares. Asterisk denotes 







Estimated markups and profits by product group  












annual profit  
(Rs. millions) 
Group share (%) of 
total estimated profits 
from quinolone sales 
Foreign ciprofloxacin 10.29 8.16 20.78% 28.22 1.12%
Foreign norfloxacin 4.99 4.99 0.00% 0.00 0.00%




Domestic ciprofloxacin 11.23 4.34 61.30% 1752.28 69.62%
Domestic norfloxacin 9.04 5.21 42.35% 268.92 10.68%
Domestic ofloxacin 88.73 58.33 34.26% 161.53 6.42%





Average observed all-India annual sales of 
quinolones:  Rs. 5.722 billion 
 
Average estimated all-India annual profits from 




Table 12  
Counterfactual estimates of consumer welfare losses from product withdrawals due to the 
introduction of pharmaceutical patents 
  
Loss of variety and: Counterfactual scenarios: 
withdrawal of one or more 
domestic product groups 
 
 















Compensating variation measured in Rs. per household per year 
30.300* 29.925* 43.471* 42.695*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (3.750) (3.665) (4.224) (4.100) 
3.898* 3.898* 5.337* 4.979*Only norfloxacin 
 (0.458) (0.457) (0.447) (0.444) 
1.648* 1.648* 2.995* 2.679*Only ofloxacin 
 (0.338) (0.337) (0.360) (0.371) 
0.441 0.449 1.924* 1.632*Only sparfloxacin 
 (0.307) (0.304) (0.326) (0.328) 
 
50.539* 49.512* 80.972* 78.619*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and ofloxacin (7.775) (7.474) (9.865) (9.124) 
45.158* 44.191* 75.044* 72.811*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and sparfloxacin (7.834) (7.551) (9.904) (9.314) 
35.227* 34.529* 61.496* 59.662*Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (6.055) (5.884) (7.676) (7.338) 
1.787† 1.788† 7.441* 6.858*Norfloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (1.056) (1.044) (1.330) (1.330) 
 
110.821* 103.851* 158.803* 154.870*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, 
ofloxacin and sparfloxacin (41.745) (42.651) (32.974) (33.183) 
 
Total compensating variation measured in Rs. billion (per year) 
5.814* 5.742* 8.341* 8.192*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (0.720) (0.703) (0.810) (0.787) 
0.748* 0.748* 1.024* 0.955*Only norfloxacin 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.086) (0.085) 
0.316* 0.316* 0.575* 0.514*Only ofloxacin 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.069) (0.071) 
0.085 0.086 0.369* 0.313*Only sparfloxacin 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.062) (0.063) 
 
9.698* 9.500* 15.537* 15.086*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and ofloxacin (1.492) (1.434) (1.893) (1.751) 
8.665* 8.479* 14.400* 13.971*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and sparfloxacin (1.503) (1.449) (1.900) (1.787) 
6.759* 6.625* 11.800* 11.448*Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (1.162) (1.129) (1.473) (1.408) 
0.343† 0.343† 1.428* 1.316*Norfloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (0.203) (0.200) (0.255) (0.255) 
 
21.265* 19.927* 30.471* 29.717*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, 
ofloxacin and sparfloxacin (8.010) (8.184) (6.327) (6.367) 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significant at 5% confidence level; † 
denotes significant at 10% confidence level. 
 
Table 13 
Counterfactual estimates of drug price increases  
after product withdrawals due to introduction of pharmaceutical patents 
 
Changes in prices with cross-segment expenditure switching  
and within-segment price adjustment (% of original price)  
Foreign product groups Domestic product groups 
Counterfactual 
scenarios: 
withdrawal of one 
or more domestic 
product groups Cipro Norflo Oflo Cipro Norflo Oflo Sparflo 
 
119.61%* 200.00% 3.15% . 31.77%* 51.74%* 65.13%*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (0.158) NA (0.136)  (0.050) (0.073) (0.086) 
3.19%* 200.00% 4.07% 3.53%* . 14.05%* 14.97%*Only norfloxacin 
 (0.014) NA (0.028) (0.005)  (0.024) (0.022) 
2.13% 200.00% 7.70% 2.99%* 7.24%* . 9.97%*Only ofloxacin 
 (0.014) NA (0.081) (0.004) (0.011)  (0.014) 
2.18% 200.00% 4.18%† 3.73%* 8.51%* 10.72%* . Only sparfloxacin 
 (0.014) NA (0.025) (0.004) (0.012) (0.019)  
 
199.36%* 500.00% 38.49% . . . 226.47%*Ciprofloxacin, 
norfloxacin and 
ofloxacin (0.230) NA (0.393)    (0.358) 
222.74%* 500.00% 25.88% . . 212.50%* . Ciprofloxacin, 
norfloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (0.254) NA (0.341)   (0.352)  
224.80%* 500.00% 49.94% . 144.24%* . . Ciprofloxacin, 
ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (0.244) NA (0.393)  (0.208)   
14.60%* 500.00% 33.58%† 23.56%* . . . Norfloxacin, 
ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (0.047) NA (0.185) (0.018)    
 
754.22%* 500.00% 210.23% . . . . Ciprofloxacin, 
norfloxacin, 
ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (2.485) NA (1.809)     




Counterfactual estimates of foregone profits of domestic producers from product withdrawals 
due to the introduction of pharmaceutical patents 
 (millions of rupees per year) 
Loss of variety and:  
 
Counterfactual scenarios: 
withdrawal of one or more 
domestic product groups 
 
 















1039.700* 1192.324* 221.946* 580.504*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (98.595) (72.265) (171.736) (112.878) 
-7.161 13.980 -178.325* -131.634*Only norfloxacin 
 (21.203) (23.442) (20.944) (21.082) 
-51.218* -53.680* -162.264* -140.422*Only ofloxacin 
 (12.138) (14.218) (14.784) (15.609) 
-48.991* -64.062* -173.191* -162.761*Only sparfloxacin 
 (14.665) (16.862) (13.247) (13.880) 
 
1235.615* 1457.821* -160.188 694.400*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and ofloxacin (125.857) (68.902) (304.882) (117.348) 
1343.305* 1522.861* -38.435 704.810*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and sparfloxacin (132.197) (79.370) (333.752) (129.365) 
1165.991* 1329.050* 138.590 692.196*Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (151.633) (106.079) (308.518) (168.213) 
-339.157* -340.213* -637.678* -552.083*Norfloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (42.546) (45.242) (53.249) (48.899) 
 
2379.083* 2379.083* 2379.083* 2379.083*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, 




Counterfactual estimates of total welfare losses from product withdrawals due to the 
introduction of pharmaceutical patents: 
 (billions of rupees per year) 
Loss of variety and:  
 
Counterfactual scenarios: 
withdrawal of one or more 
domestic product groups 
 
 















6.854* 6.934* 8.563* 8.773*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (0.653) (0.666) (0.691) (0.727) 
0.741* 0.762* 0.846* 0.824*Only norfloxacin 
 (0.098) (0.103) (0.091) (0.095) 
0.265* 0.263* 0.412* 0.374*Only ofloxacin 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) (0.080) 
0.036 0.022 0.196* 0.150*Only sparfloxacin 
 (0.069) (0.071) (0.068) (0.072) 
 
10.933* 10.958* 15.377* 15.780*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and ofloxacin (1.393) (1.400) (1.643) (1.768) 
10.008* 10.002* 14.361* 14.676*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and sparfloxacin (1.399) (1.403) (1.624) (1.753) 
7.925* 7.954* 11.939* 12.140*Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (1.049) (1.065) (1.243) (1.324) 
0.004 0.003 0.790* 0.764*Norfloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (0.211) (0.220) (0.248) (0.264) 
 
23.644* 22.306* 32.850* 32.096*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, 





Counterfactual estimates of profit gains of foreign producers from product withdrawals due to 
the introduction of pharmaceutical patents 
 (millions of rupees per year) 
Loss of variety and:  
 
Counterfactual scenarios: 
withdrawal of one or more 
domestic product groups 
 
 















191.837* 150.466* 580.502* 448.265*Only ciprofloxacin 
 (60.004) (56.159) (141.936) (122.364) 
4.852 3.704 17.647* 13.831*Only norfloxacin 
 (6.296) (6.269) (6.762) (6.586) 
10.891 11.025 33.233† 30.765†Only ofloxacin 
 (13.971) (14.003) (17.452) (17.368) 
3.173 3.964 26.748* 25.030*Only sparfloxacin 
 (4.759) (4.742) (8.246) (8.173) 
 
334.959* 233.738* 1096.669* 644.942*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and ofloxacin (88.213) (78.809) (233.072) (196.646) 
330.056* 243.271* 1186.147* 756.352*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin 
and sparfloxacin (96.694) (89.463) (260.333) (223.347) 
372.315* 301.896* 1287.924* 929.492*Ciprofloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (91.409) (85.644) (250.924) (220.054) 
58.295 58.362 111.261* 102.020*Norfloxacin, ofloxacin and 
sparfloxacin (42.728) (42.714) (46.714) (45.233) 
 
1182.492* 428.543 4338.432* 2609.371*Ciprofloxacin, norfloxacin, 
ofloxacin and sparfloxacin (277.008) (421.396) (291.126) (342.118) 
 
 
 
 
 
